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CAUSATION: LINGUISTIC, PHILOSOPHICAL, LEGAL AND 
ECONOMIC †
RICHARD W. WRIGHT* & INGEBORG PUPPE**
I. INTRODUCTION
Causation of a legally recognized injury by the wrongful aspect of the 
defendant’s conduct is a fundamental requirement, as a matter of interac-
tive (“corrective”) justice and actual practice, for the defendant’s legal 
responsibility for such injury to an individual (through tort law for the pri-
vate wrong) or to all members of society (through criminal law for the pub-
lic wrong). To achieve rough or second-best justice in tort law in situations 
in which causation may exist but generally is impossible to prove, some 
courts have created presumptions of causation or imposed proportional 
liability based on a statistical probability of causation,1 but liability is never 
imposed if causation is clearly lacking, unless denial of liability would 
distort a second-best just liability scheme.2
†Copyright 2016 Ingeborg Puppe and Richard W. Wright, either of whom may grant permission to 
copy. All rights reserved. Permission is hereby granted to copy for noncommercial purposes as long as 
proper citation is made to this publication. This paper was written at the same time as two other papers 
on the same topics, portions of which contain substantially the same text as portions of this paper. See
Ingeborg Puppe & Richard W. Wright, Causation in the Law: Philosophy, Doctrine and Practice, in
THE COMMON CORE OF EUROPEAN PRIVATE LAW: CAUSATION (Marta Infantino & Eleni Zervogianni 
eds., 2016); Richard W. Wright, The New Old Efficiency Theories of Causation and Liability, 7 J. TORT 
L. 65 (2015) [hereinafter Wright, New Old Efficiency Theories]. We are very grateful to Thomas 
Grosse-Wilde for his extensive assistance and advice, without which none of our joint work would be 
possible.
*University Distinguished Professor and Professor of Law, Chicago-Kent College of Law, Illinois 
Institute of Technology.
**Emeritus Professor of Law, Rheinische Friedrich-Wilhelms University of Bonn.
1. See, e.g., SANDY STEEL, PROOF OF CAUSATION IN TORT LAW 1–5, 38–41 (2015); Duncan 
Fairgrieve & Florence G’sell-Macrez, Causation in French Law: Pragmatism and Policy, in
PERSPECTIVES ON CAUSATION 111, 111–16, 123–24, 126–27 (Richard Goldberg ed., 2011); Jaap Spier 
& Olav A. Haazen, Comparative Conclusions on Causation, in UNIFICATION OF TORT LAW:
CAUSATION 127, 127 (Jaap Spier ed., 2000); Richard W. Wright, The Grounds and Extent of Legal 
Responsibility, 40 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 1425, 1429–34 (2003) [hereinafter Wright, Legal Responsibility];
Richard W. Wright, Liability for Possible Wrongs: Causation, Statistical Probability, and the Burden of 
Proof, 41 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 1295, 1324–30 (2008) [hereinafter Wright, Possible Wrongs]; infra part V.
2. See Wright, Possible Wrongs, supra note 1, at 1325–30 (discussing Hymowitz v. Eli Lilly & 
Co., 539 N.E.2d 1069 (N.Y. 1989)), in which the court refused to let defendants who marketed DES for 
birth-related purposes avoid liability by proving lack of causation for a specific plaintiff since allowing 
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In this paper, we briefly survey the linguistic, philosophical, legal, and 
economic usages and analyses of the concept of causation. In part II, we 
discuss the ambiguous usages of causal language in ordinary speech and 
legal discourse and argue that, to promote clear identification and proper 
analysis of the basic natural/factual/actual causation issue and the distinct 
normative legal responsibility issue, such ambiguity should be eliminated 
in legal discourse by using causal language to refer solely to causation in its 
basic sense. In part III, we discuss the philosophical foundations of the 
modern analysis of causation in its basic sense. While lawyers frequently 
scoff at philosophical analyses of causation,3 their failure (shared by many 
philosophers) to clearly distinguish the descriptive issue of causation in its 
basic sense from the normative issue of legal responsibility and to appreci-
ate John Stuart Mill’s path-breaking “covering law” analysis of causation 
in its basic sense has until now mired law in considerable confusion. In part 
IV.A, we criticize the strong necessity (sine qua non or “but for”) criterion, 
especially in its usually assumed counterfactual form, which is often 
claimed to be the exclusive criterion for identifying causes in specific situa-
tions. In part IV.B, we discuss the more comprehensive weak necessi-
ty/strong sufficiency criterion, based on Mill’s covering law analysis, of 
which the strong necessity criterion is merely a corollary that works only 
when there is no causal overdetermination. In part V, we discuss the proce-
dural standards of persuasion, which should and usually do require for-
mation of a minimal belief rather than a mere statistical probability, and the 
courts’ adoption of second-best liability rules when it is inherently impos-
sible to prove or disprove causation. In part VI, we criticize the legal econ-
omists’ attempts to explain the causation requirement for legal 
responsibility, despite causation’s being irrelevant under the efficiency 
theories of liability. Part VII contains a brief conclusion.
3. See, e.g., RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF THE LAW OF TORTS § 431 cmt. a (AM. LAW INST.
1965) (distinguishing the legal and popular sense of causation from “cause in the so-called ‘philosophic 
sense’”); FREDERICK POLLOCK, THE LAW OF TORTS: A TREATISE ON THE PRINCIPLES OF OBLIGATIONS 
ARISING FROM CIVIL WRONGS IN THE COMMON LAW (11th ed. 1920) (“the lawyer cannot afford to 
adventure himself with philosophers in the logical and metaphysical controversies that beset the idea of 
cause”); Spier & Haazen, supra note 1, at 130–31; Jane Stapleton, Causation in the Law, in THE 
OXFORD HANDBOOK OF CAUSATION 744, 749 (Helen Beebee et al. eds., 2009) [hereinafter OXFORD 
HANDBOOK] (“Traditionally, most lawyers disdain philosophical inquiries into causation. In my opin-
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II. CAUSAL TERMINOLOGY: DISTINGUISHING CAUSATION PER SE
FROM LEGAL RESPONSIBILITY
In ordinary speech as well as legal discourse, attributions of causation 
usually are based not only on causation in its basic sense, which refers to 
the content and operation of the laws of nature (“causal laws”), but also to 
identify one or more of the contributing conditions as being more signifi-
cant than the others in the particular context.4 In law, the usual relevant 
context is the assessment of legal responsibility for some specific state of 
affairs. Thus, in legal discourse, causal language is often employed to refer 
not only to causation in its basic sense, but also—employing phrases such 
as “lien de causalité,” “Kausalzusammenhang,” “legal cause,” “proximate 
cause,” “material contribution,” “substantial factor,” or merely “cause”—to 
the normatively based principles for limiting the defendant’s legal respon-
sibility for the consequences of his wrongful conduct.5
The principal limitations on legal responsibility for wrongfully caused 
consequences also invoke causal laws. They do so, however, not with ref-
erence to the causal status of the defendant’s wrongful conduct, which has 
already been found or assumed to be true, but rather with reference to 
whether  the legal injury (and related damages) (i) almost certainly would 
have occurred anyway as a result of some other, non-responsible condi-
tion(s) (the “no worse off” limitation, which is often confused with the 
conditio sine qua non (“but for”) test for causation per se), (ii) occurred 
only because of the intervention of some other, highly unexpected cause 
(the “superseding cause” limitation, including “force majeure”), or (iii) did 
not result from the continued operation or playing out along the causal 
chain of a risk that made the conduct wrongful (variously described as the 
“adequacy,” “scope of the risk,” “risk playout” or “continuity” limitation).6
4. H.L.A. HART & TONY HONORÉ, CAUSATION IN THE LAW 11–13 (2d ed. 1985); J.L. MACKIE,
THE CEMENT OF THE UNIVERSE: A STUDY OF CAUSATION 34–37, 120 (corrected ed. 1980); JOHN 
STUART MILL, A SYSTEM OF LOGIC: RATIOCINATIVE AND INDUCTIVE bk. III, ch. V, §§ 3 & 4 (8th ed., 
Longmans, Green & Co. 1872) (1843); David Lewis, Causation, 70 J. PHIL. 556, 558–59 (1973).
5. WALTER VAN GERVEN ET AL., CASES, MATERIALS AND TEXT ON NATIONAL,
SUPRANATIONAL AND INTERNATIONAL TORT LAW 395 n. 5 (2000); Ingeborg Puppe, The Concept of 
Causation in the Law, in CRITICAL ESSAYS ON “CAUSATION AND RESPONSIBILITY” 67, 68 (Benedikt 
Kahmen & Markus Stepanians eds., 2013) [hereinafter Puppe, Concept]; Richard W. Wright, Once 
More into the Bramble Bush: Duty, Causal Contribution, and the Extent of Legal Responsibility, 54 
VAND. L. REV. 1071, 1072–80 (2001) [hereinafter Wright, Once More]. 
6. For discussion of the no worse off, superseding cause and risk playout limitations, see Wright, 
Legal Responsibility, supra note 1, at 1434–51; cf. Spier & Haazen, supra note 1, at 141–46 (no worse 
off situations). For discussion of the continuity limitation, see Ingeborg Puppe, Negligence and Respon-
sibility in German Road Traffic Law, 11 EUR. J. CRIME, CRIM. L. & CRIM. JUSTICE 151, 161–62 (2003) 
[hereinafter Puppe, Road Traffic]; cf. Fairgrieve & G’sell-Macrez, supra note 1, at 119 (discussing 
Dejean de la Bâtie’s “continued spread of evil” analysis, which requires “that when many events occur 
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The use of causal terminology to refer not only to causation in its 
basic sense but also to the normative issue of attributing legal responsibility 
has generated considerable disagreement and confusion over the nature of 
and differences between these two quite different issues and, as a result, 
frequent failures to distinguish them and to apply the proper empirical or 
normative analysis, respectively, to each of them.7 As the American Law 
Institute (ALI) has recently emphasized, legal reasoning by courts and law-
yers would be much clearer and properly focused if causal terminology 
were applied only to causation in its basic sense. After having promoted the 
confusion of causation and responsibility for 75 years by lumping the em-
pirical and normative issues together under the phrases “legal causation” 
and “substantial factor” in the first and second Restatements of the Law of 
Torts,8 the ALI in the recently published Restatement Third uses “factual 
causation” to refer to causation in its basic sense and “scope of liability” to 
refer to the separate issue of appropriate legal responsibility.9 In the re-
mainder of this paper, we focus solely on the issue of causation in its basic 
sense.
III. PHILOSOPHICAL FOUNDATIONS
A. David Hume’s Regularity Theory
Writing in the first half of the 18th century, David Hume argued, con-
trary to the then popular belief, that singular causal judgments are not based 
on direct perception of causation or causal qualities or forces inherent in 
objects or events. No such directly perceptible qualities or forces have ever 
explains the unlawfulness of the subsequent fact”). For discussion of the adequacy and scope of the risk 
limitations, see CEES VAN DAM, EUROPEAN TORT LAW 312–16 (2d ed. 2013); VAN GERVEN ET AL.,
supra note 5, at 397–407; 2 CHRISTIAN VON BAR, THE COMMON EUROPEAN LAW OF TORTS 439
(2000); Fairgrieve & G’sell-Macrez, supra note 1, at 118–19, 120–21; Spier & Haazen, supra note 1, at 
132–33.
7. E.g., HART & HONORÉ, supra note 4; MICHAEL S. MOORE, CAUSATION AND RESPONSIBILITY:
AN ESSAY IN LAW, MORALS, AND METAPHYSICS (2009); VAN DAM, supra note 6, at 307–11; VAN
GERVEN ET AL., supra note 5, at 395; VON BAR, supra note 6, at 435–40, 459–61 et seq.; Jonathan 
Schaffer, Contrastive Causation, 114 PHIL. REV. 297, 312–16, 318–19 (2005). This failure appears in 
all of Jane Stapleton’s writings on causation, most clearly in her earlier papers but also in her most 
recent paper. See Wright, Once More, supra note 5, at 1119–23; cf. Jane Stapleton, An “Extended But-
For” Test for the Causal Relation in the Law of Obligations, 35 OXFORD J. LEGAL STUD. 697, 702, 
715–23 (2015) [hereinafter Stapleton, Extended But-For].
8. RESTATEMENT OF THE LAW OF TORTS §§ 430–434 (AM. LAW INST. 1934); RESTATEMENT 
(SECOND) OF THE LAW OF TORTS §§ 430–434 (AM. LAW INST. 1965); see Wright, Once More, supra
note 5, at 1073–80.
9. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW OF TORTS: LIABILITY FOR PHYSICAL AND EMOTIONAL 
HARM §§ 26, 27 & 29 (AM. LAW INST. 2010). However, confusion persists in the Restatement Third’s
elaboration of the substantive criteria and procedural standards of proof for resolving the factual causa-
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been identified. Instead, Hume insisted, all we observe are uniform regular-
ities of succession, whereby the occurrence of one object is invariably fol-
lowed by the occurrence of a temporally and physically contiguous distinct 
object, from which we psychologically infer or induce a necessary connec-
tion between the first object and the second.10
Hume provided two definitions of a cause and the related idea of a 
necessary connection, which he seemed to view as being equivalent, but 
which are quite different:
[W]e may define a cause to be an object, followed by another, and where
all the objects similar to the first are followed by objects similar to the 
second. Or in other words where, if the first object had not been, the sec-
ond never had existed.11
The first definition describes the occurrence of the first object (the 
cause) as being sufficient for (necessitating) the occurrence of the second 
object (the effect). The second defines the occurrence of the first object as 
being necessary for the occurrence of the second. Moreover, it assumes that 
the first object (or one of its properties) is strictly necessary for the occur-
rence of the second, in the sense that the second never occurs in the ab-
sence of the first (or some property of the first shared by all other causes of 
the second). Hume’s belief that these definitions are equivalent reflects his 
apparent belief that the causal relation is a two-way (if and only if) necessi-
ty relation: neither object (as a whole or with respect to some property) can 
occur in the absence of the other.12 His discussion focused on the first defi-
nition, which has come to be known as the “regularity” account and is sub-
ject to numerous counter-examples.13 Philosophers and lawyers, therefore, 
have generally focused on the second (necessary condition) definition, 
although in a less strict sense.
10. DAVID HUME, A TREATISE OF HUMAN NATURE bk. I, pt. III, § XIV (1739–1740) [hereinafter 
HUME, TREATISE]; DAVID HUME, AN ENQUIRY CONCERNING HUMAN UNDERSTANDING § VII, pts. I–II
(1748) [hereinafter HUME, ENQUIRY]. Sandy Steel claims, like Mackie but contrary to Hume and almost 
every other philosopher, that we sometimes can directly perceive causation without even implicitly 
relying on assumed uniform regularities or causal laws. STEEL, supra note 1, at 67, 67 n.107; see infra
text accompanying note 34. 
11. HUME, ENQUIRY, supra note 10, § VII, pt. II.
12. HUME, TREATISE, supra note 10, bk. I, pt. III, § XV (rules 4–6).
13. See, e.g., Lewis, supra note 4, at 563–67. Incredibly, von Bar states that whether a distinction 
between “the causal and the merely temporal succession of events . . . is fundamentally justifiable is 
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B. Arthur Schopenhauer’s Law of Causality
In his doctoral thesis, On the Fourfold Root of the Principle of Suffi-
cient Reason, originally published in 1813 and substantially revised in 
1847, Arthur Schopenhauer identified the Law of Causality as one of the 
four different applications of the Principle of Sufficient Reason, which 
states that nothing is without a reason for its being. The four roots are dis-
tinguished from one another based on the nature of the relation at issue.14
The Law of Causality, which applies to physical relations among material 
objects, is the principle of sufficient reason of becoming, which states an 
empirical physical necessity for the occurrence of specific changes in some 
states of affairs given prior changes in other states of affairs.15 Although he 
did not refer to Hume’s analysis in the original 1813 publication, he agreed 
with Hume’s empirical inductive approach to determining causal relations, 
but as an a priori truth about material reality rather than a mere psychologi-
cal belief. In a section added to the 1847 edition, he curtly dismissed 
Hume’s apparent skepticism about any real laws of causation.16 Moreover, 
contrary to Hume’s apparent supposition, Schopenhauer observed that the 
cause of some effect is not a single prior object or changed condition but 
rather a set of conditions, each of which is necessary for the set to be suffi-
cient for the change in a different condition that constitutes the effect. 
While we often designate as the cause the last change to occur that com-
pletes the sufficient set, scientifically and philosophically, the cause is the 
entire set.17
C. John Stuart Mill’s Laws of Nature (Covering Law18) Theory
In A System of Logic, first published in 1843, John Stuart Mill correct-
ed and advanced Hume’s analysis on numerous points, most of which are 
ignored by current philosophers. Like Schopenhauer, Mill replaced Hume’s 
skeptical treatment of causation as a mere psychological belief with an 
account of causation as the instantiation in specific situations of the laws of 
nature. He explained that to be a law of nature—a causal law—the lawful 
(always true) relation must be empirically induced from observation and 
14. ARTHUR SCHOPENHAUER, ON THE FOURFOLD ROOT OF THE PRINCIPLE OF SUFFICIENT 
REASON §§ 5, 16, 20 (E.F.J. Payne trans., Open Court 1999) (2d ed. 1847).
15. Id. § 20.
16. Id. § 12.
17. Id. § 20.
18. For ease of reference we will use this term to refer to Mill’s account, although many covering 
law and related deductive nomological theories fail to capture all of the details of Mill’s theory or its 
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reflection on natural events and states of affairs, rather than being merely 
analytical—that is logical, definitional, mathematical, or mereological (the 
relation of a whole to its constituent parts). Moreover, to be a law of nature, 
a regularity has to be not only invariable in experience but also uncondi-
tional—that is, not subject to any exceptions under possible actual condi-
tions. It also must be a member of the set of the simplest, fewest, mutually 
consistent such regularities from which all causal generalizations, natural 
events, and states of affairs can be explained.19 Although philosophers gen-
erally fail to recognize or acknowledge this, these conditions render Mill’s 
laws of nature account immune to the counter-examples that plague 
Hume’s regularity theory.20
Like Schopenhauer, Mill also differed from Hume by noting that the 
antecedent portion of a causal law rarely, if ever, includes only a single 
abstract object, but instead consists of a minimally sufficient set of abstract 
conditions which, when fully instantiated in a specific situation, is suffi-
cient for the instantiation of the consequent of the causal law. Like Scho-
penhauer, he insisted that, although we usually refer to only one or some of 
the instantiated conditions in the antecedent as the cause(s), with the cho-
sen condition(s) varying depending on our purpose in the specific context, 
and treat the others as mere “conditions,” philosophically and scientifically 
there is no basis for such discrimination.21 He described the proper scien-
tific methods of observation and experimentation, including especially the 
Method of Difference (experimentally changing only one condition while 
holding all others constant), for attempting to determine by induction and 
ratiocination the minimally sufficient conditions in the antecedent of a 
causal law.22
Despite stating that “from nothing, a mere negation, nothing can pro-
ceed,” Mill noted that the antecedent of a causal law will almost always 
include not only positive conditions but also negative conditions, not as 
“producing” causes but as “the mere absence of a preventing cause,” the 
absence of which allows a positive causal process that otherwise was being 
or would have been prevented to proceed.23
19. MILL, supra note 4, bk. III, ch. III, § 1; bk. III, ch. IV; bk. III, ch. V, §§ 1, 6.
20. See Puppe, Concept, supra note 5, at 86–97, 101–05; Richard W. Wright, The NESS Account 
of Natural Causation: A Response to Criticisms, in PERSPECTIVES ON CAUSATION, supra note 1, 285, 
295–322 [hereinafter Wright, NESS Account]; but see Mackie, supra note 4, at 59–87, 59 n.1.
21. MILL, supra note 4, bk. III, ch. V, § 3, vii n.*.
22. Id. bk. III, chs. VII–VIII.
23. Id. bk. III, ch. V, § 3, vii n.*; contra, e.g., MOORE, supra note 7, at 53–55, 399–400, 436–37, 
444–45, 460–61; Roderick Bagshaw, Causing the Behaviour of Others and Other Causal Mixtures, in
PERSPECTIVES ON CAUSATION, supra note 1, 361, 374–75; Douglas Ehring, Causal Relata, in OXFORD 
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Mill also noted, contrary to Hume’s assumption, that more than one 
abstract set of minimally sufficient conditions may be specified for the 
occurrence of a certain effect—for example, death, which can occur in 
different ways—and that different causes may interact in a specific situa-
tion to reinforce or counteract each other. However, he assumed (i) that 
only one minimally sufficient set would be instantiated in any specific situ-
ation and (ii) that the joint operation of independent causal processes in a 
specific situation would always produce dissimilar effects than those that 
would be produced by each acting separately—either a summation of the 
effects of each acting separately or a completely different effect.24 Thus, 
although he rejected Hume’s strict necessity criterion for a causal condi-
tion, according to which a condition is not a cause of some effect unless the 
effect never occurs in the absence of that condition, he apparently assumed 
that a condition must be strongly necessary, in the sense that it was neces-
sary for the occurrence of the effect in the specific situation. While this 
assumption may be true when considering whole events or states of affairs, 
at least in cases of duplicative rather than preemptive causation, it is false 
when considering the properties of events or states of affairs, which are the 
scientifically, philosophically, and legally relevant causal relata.25
Mill explained that, although mathematical laws or theorems—for ex-
ample that two plus two equals four or that the angles of a triangle always
add up to 180 degrees—are not empirical laws of succession and thus are 
not in themselves causal laws, as general laws of number and space they 
often are included as analytical elements in causal laws.26 Similarly, in 
jurisprudence, we have to use institutional rules created by humans, such as 
voting and liability rules, to determine legal results. These institutional 
rules are not causal laws, or indeed laws at all in the scientific or philosoph-
allowing causes and are essential elements in every causal process involving human actions and many 
not involving human actions. See Dieter Birnbacher & David Hommen, Omissions as Causes—
Genuine, Quasi, or Not at All?, in CRITICAL ESSAYS ON “CAUSATION AND RESPONSIBILITY”, supra
note 5, 133; Ingeborg Puppe, Der Erfolg und seine kausale Erklärung im Strafrecht, 92 ZStW 863, 
895–99 (1980) [hereinafter Puppe, Der Erfolg] (English translation available at 
http://papers.ssrn.com/abstract_id=2743259); Puppe, Concept, supra note 5, at 82–83; Jonathan Schaf-
fer, Causes Need Not Be Physically Connected to Their Effects: The Case for Negative Causation, in
CONTEMPORARY DEBATES IN PHILOSOPHY OF SCIENCE 197 (Christopher Hitchcock ed., 2004); Wright, 
NESS Account, supra note 20, at 311–21; Richard W. Wright, Causation: Metaphysics or Intuition, in
LEGAL, MORAL, AND METAPHYSICAL TRUTHS: THE PHILOSOPHY OF MICHAEL S. MOORE 171, 177–82 
(Kimberly Kessler Ferzan & Stephen J. Morse eds., 2016). The cited papers by Wright provide the 
metaphysical account of negative conditions as causes and the criticism of opposing accounts that 
Stapleton claims that he fails to provide. See Stapleton, Extended But-For, supra note 7, at 701–02. 
24. MILL, supra note 4, bk. III, ch. X, §§ 1–3 on the “plurality of causes”; id. bk. III, ch. VI &
bk. III, ch. X, §§ 1, 4–5 on the “intermixture of effects.”
25. See infra text accompanying notes 56–60.





      05/10/2016   13:13:34
37837-ckt_91-2 Sheet No. 21 Side A      05/10/2016   13:13:34
03 WRIGHT PUPPE-FINAL (DO NOT DELETE) 4/14/2016 7:21 PM
2016] CAUSATION 469
ical sense of being universally applicable, but they are applicable in a cer-
tain society and they are general regularities, which like causal laws govern 
single cases and can be used to explain them. However, although institu-
tional rules govern institutional facts independent of their psychological 
effects, the bare fact of their being satisfied in a particular case has no natu-
ral/actual effect, which occurs only if and when the institutional fact of 
their being satisfied is recognized by the relevant parties and/or officials 
and causes them to take certain actions, as with the concrete application of 
mathematical rules in specific instances in commerce and life.27
As Hume emphasized with regard to assumed uniform regularities,28
Mill emphasized that our knowledge of the laws of nature, being inductive-
ly derived from actual experience, can never be assumed to be complete. 
Even if it were complete, we ordinarily employ causal generalizations, 
which are incomplete (and thus contingent) and encompass, usually at a 
gross macro level, a multitude of successive or simultaneously operative 
more specific generalizations and the underlying laws of nature.29 Never-
theless, he insisted, an assertion of causation always involves, implicitly, an 
assertion of the complete instantiation of a network of underlying causal 
laws, even when this assertion is based on a single observation.30
D. John Mackie’s INUS / Strong Necessity Analysis
Among philosophers, the best known Millian analysis of causation 
was initially published in 1965 by John Mackie, who employed an acro-
nym, INUS (for “insufficient but non-redundant [necessary] part of an un-
necessary but sufficient condition”), to refer to the conditions that make up 
the minimally sufficient set of abstract conditions that constitute a causal 
law.31 If applied as a criterion for being an actual causal condition in a con-
crete singular instance, the INUS criterion would be one way of describing 
the least stringent, weak sense of necessity, which merely requires that a 
condition be necessary for the sufficiency of a set of actual conditions that 
was sufficient for the occurrence of the effect, rather than being always 
27. Thus, the use of institutional rules as part of the analysis of causation in law and other areas of 
life does not expose any deficiency in the laws-of-nature based covering law account of causation. 
Contra STEEL, supra note 1, at 32–33, 35; Stapleton, Extended But-For, supra note 7, at 699, 702 n.19, 
703; cf. Puppe, Concept, supra note 5, at 84–85.
28. HUME, TREATISE, supra note 10, bk. I, pt. III; HUME, ENQUIRY, supra note 10, § IV, pt. II; § 
V, pt. I; § VII, pt. II.
29. MILL, supra note 4, bk. III, ch. III, § 2; bk. III, ch. IV § 1; bk. III, ch. V, §§ 2–3.
30. Id. bk. III, ch. I, § 2 & vii n.*; bk. III, ch. III, § 3; bk. III, ch. V, § 2.
31. MACKIE, supra note 4, at 62. Chapter 3 (pages 59–87) of MACKIE is a revised version of 
J.L. 
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necessary (strict necessity) or necessary for the effect in the singular in-
stance (strong necessity).32 However, Mackie and other philosophers writ-
ing around the same time followed Mill in employing this weak necessity 
criterion only to identify the minimally sufficient set of conditions in a 
causal law, while insisting on the strong necessity criterion in singular in-
stances of causation.33 Furthermore, unlike Mill, Mackie claimed that the 
strong necessity criterion can be and often is applied in specific instances 
using singularist analogical/contrastive reasoning, without any need to refer 
even implicitly to causal laws.34 Both philosophers and lawyers generally 
fail to note these aspects of Mackie’s theory and credit him, rather than 
Herbert Hart and Tony Honoré, who wrote before him and of whose work 
he was aware,35 with the initial development and application of the weak 
necessity criterion for singular instances of causation.
E. David Lewis’s Counterfactuals Theory
In both philosophy and law, it is generally assumed that application of 
the strong necessity criterion requires a counterfactual (hypothetical) in-
quiry: if the actual condition at issue had not occurred, what would have 
happened?36 However, logicians point out that this counterfactual inquiry 
cannot produce any determinate truth value. If the antecedent of a condition 
is false, this so called unreal conditional clause is true whether the conse-
quent is true or not. Ex falso quodlibet.37
In an attempt to provide a logically valid basis for the counterfactual 
interpretation of the strong necessity criterion, David Lewis introduced 
possible worlds, which he considered to be real, albeit slightly different 
32. Richard W. Wright, Causation, Responsibility, Risk, Probability, Naked Statistics, and Proof: 
Pruning the Bramble Bush by Clarifying the Concepts, 73 IOWA L. REV. 1001, 1020 (1988) [hereinafter 
Wright, Pruning]; see MACKIE, supra note 4, at 38–48, 126–27; Puppe, Der Erfolg, supra note 23, at 
865–69, 875–76.
33. MACKIE, supra note 4, at 38–48, 76–77, 126–27. Mackie’s arguments are criticized in Puppe, 
Concept, supra note 5, at 71–72; Wright, Pruning, supra note 32, at 1023–34.
34. MACKIE, supra note 4, at 56, 77–78, 121–24, 224, 257 n.14, 267–68; contra, Puppe, Concept,
supra note 5, at 71–72, 74–78; Wright, Pruning, supra note 32, at 1031–34.
35. See infra text accompanying notes 87–91. Honoré notes that Mackie “applied our idea” in 
developing his INUS account. Tony Honoré, Necessary and Sufficient Conditions in Tort Law, in
PHILOSOPHICAL FOUNDATIONS OF TORT LAW 363, 365 (David G. Owen ed., 1990).
36. E.g., HART & HONORÉ, supra note 4, at lviii–lxi; STEEL, supra note 1, at 9, 17; Honoré, supra
note 35, at 370–72; Jonathan Schaffer, Contrastive Causation in the Law, 16 LEGAL THEORY 259, 260–
62, 270–73, 291 (2010); Stapleton, Extended But-For, supra note 7, at 702–03, 703 n.25, 705–08; but
see MOORE, supra note 7, at 374–82, 390 n.61 (discussing covering law analyses of counterfactual 
statements).
37. E.g., WOLFGANG STEGMÜLLER, PROBLEME UND RESULTATE DER WISSENSCHAFTSTHEORIE 
UND ANALYTISCHE PHILOSOPHIE: ERKLÄRUNG, BEGRÜNDUNG, KAUSALITÄT 329–30 (2d ed. 1983); 
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from our world. In such a possible world the statement that the actual con-
dition that occurred in our real world did not occur can be true, so the 
statement that in this possible world the consequence also did not occur 
makes sense. Lewis treats an event as causal for a result if the possible 
world in which this event and its result do not occur is more similar to our 
real world than any other possible world. To determine what would happen 
in various possible worlds, we have to presume that they are governed by 
causal laws, and if they are similar to our real world, these causal laws have 
to be the same as in our real world. But in such a possible world you cannot 
omit any event or fact which has taken or would take place according to 
those causal laws, given all the existing and prior conditions, without vio-
lating those laws. To solve this problem, Lewis arbitrarily stipulated that a 
targeted violation of the causal laws (i.e., a miracle) is less of a departure 
from our real world than a wholesale change in the past and future causal 
history. He relies on such targeted miracles to get the desired factual situa-
tion in which the condition at issue is not present in the possible world and 
then applies the causal laws.38
As the above description of Lewis’s possible worlds analysis indi-
cates, the strong necessity criterion depends for its application on a Millian 
covering law analysis, although this is rarely acknowledged by proponents 
of the strong necessity criterion. The only rational way to answer the ques-
tion whether a certain condition would have happened if some other condi-
tion had not happened is to refer to universal laws under which one can 
subsume the fictional case that the latter condition did not occur.39 Thus, 
almost all proponents of the strong necessity criterion are, unlike Mackie, 
causal generalists, in the sense that they explicitly or implicitly base the 
necessity of a condition for the occurrence of the effect on causal laws. In 
overdetermined causation situations, in which there were two or more min-
imal sets of conditions that were actually sufficient (duplicative causation) 
or hypothetically sufficient (preemptive causation) for the occurrence of the 
effect, the proponents of the strong necessity criterion often shift, without 
realizing it, into covering law analysis rather than strong necessity analysis. 
For example, Mackie states that we usually have no difficulty identifying 
38. Lewis, supra note 4, at 560–63, 566–67; see MOORE, supra note 7, at 384–90; L.A. PAUL &
NED HALL, CAUSATION: A USER’S GUIDE 16–17, 43–51 (2013).
39. RUDOLF CARNAP, AN INTRODUCTION TO THE PHILOSOPHY OF SCIENCE 209–10 (Martin 
Gardner ed., 1995); KARL ENGISCH, DIE KAUSALITÄT ALS MERKMAL DER STRAFRECHTLICHEN 
TATBESTÄNDE 17–19, 24–26 (1931) (English translation of selected pages available at 
http://papers.ssrn.com/abstract_id=2743661); HELMUT KOZIOL, BASIC QUESTIONS OF TORT LAW FROM 
A GERMANIC PERSPECTIVE 135 (2012); Puppe, Der Erfolg, supra note 23, at 868–69; Puppe, Concept,
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the actual cause in preemptive causation situations, but his explanation of 
why this is so relies on covering law analysis rather than strong necessity: 
“Where we have no hesitation in making causal statements we can tell 
some more detailed causal story . . . . But the rival story about the alterna-
tive or reserve cause [preempted condition] cannot be completed.”40
However, for Lewis and his followers, who have dominated the philo-
sophical discussion of causation for the last forty years,41 the essence of 
singular instances of causation is not the subsumption of a specific situation 
under some set of causal laws or generalizations, but rather the counterfac-
tual sentence about the most similar possible world with localized targeted 
miracles, assuming the same causal laws as in our real world. Setting aside 
the resort to miracles, asking what hypothetically would have occurred if 
the condition at issue had not taken place leaves the way open for indeter-
minate speculation. For example, if the driver had not been going ten miles 
over the speed limit, how fast or slow would he have been going, or would 
he instead have been playing golf? The practical solution to this problem in 
the law, as in Lewis’s possible worlds theory using targeted miracles, is to 
reverse or think away only the condition at issue and then to run the causal 
laws, to the extent possible, to try to figure out what would have happened, 
while ignoring the fact that reversing the condition at issue would require 
changing many prior conditions in the possible world given those causal 
laws, which changes would result in quite different effects when running 
the causal laws.42 Yet, even if we do this, we are often left to indeterminate 
speculation regarding what would have occurred once the condition at issue 
is reversed or thought away.43
As Leon Green long ago noted, the counterfactual interpretation of the 
strong necessity criterion “take[s] the eye off the ball” by asking what 
would have occurred if things had been different, rather than how what 
happened did occur given things as they actually were.44 The strong neces-
40. MACKIE, supra note 4, at 45; see id. at 33–34 (relying on covering law analysis to resolve the 
epiphenomena problem); Honoré, supra note 35, at 376–79; Jane Stapleton, Choosing What We Mean 
by “Causation” in the Law, 73 MO. L. REV. 433, 452–53, 453 n.45 (2008) [hereinafter Stapleton, 
Choosing]; Stapleton, Extended But-For, supra note 7, at 709 (“the prevention mechanism . . . would 
have been complete”). For elaboration of the distinction between duplicative and preemptive causation, 
see infra text at note 49.
41. E.g., CAUSATION AND COUNTERFACTUALS (John Collins et al. eds., 2004).
42. E.g., STEEL, supra note 1, at 17; Friedrich Toepel, Causal Overdetermination, in CRITICAL 
ESSAYS ON “CAUSATION AND RESPONSIBILITY,” supra note 5, 111, 125–26.
43. MOORE, supra note 7, at 85; Puppe, Der Erfolg, supra note 23, at 868–70; Puppe, Road 
Traffic, supra note 6, at 151–53; Schaffer, Contrastive Causation in the Law, supra note 36, at 270–71, 
283–85; Wright, Pruning, supra note 32, at 1040–41.
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sity criterion, when properly applied through a real world factual analysis 
rather than a possible worlds counterfactual analysis, is a corollary of the 
covering law analysis of causation that is valid only when there is no causal 
overdetermination45 and has two steps, the second of which is causally 
irrelevant but is satisfied when there is no causal overdetermination: (1) 
was the condition at issue part of the complete instantiation in the specific 
situation of the antecedent of one or more relevant causal generalizations 
and their underlying laws that have as their ultimate consequence the effect 
at issue (the covering law analysis); and (2) were the other existing condi-
tions insufficient without the condition at issue for such complete instantia-
tion (the strong necessity analysis)?46
IV. CAUSATION IN THE LAW
A. Strong Necessity (Sine Qua Non / But For)
In both law and philosophy, the usually assumed criterion for identify-
ing a condition as a cause in a specific situation is the strong necessity (sine 
qua non) criterion, which states that a condition was a cause of an effect if 
the effect would not have occurred in the absence of (but for) the existence 
of the condition in the specific situation.47 As was discussed in part III.E
immediately above,48 it also is generally (but erroneously) assumed that 
proper application of the strong necessity criterion—or any other necessity 
criterion—requires a counterfactual, hypothetical inquiry: if the actual con-
dition at issue had not occurred, what would have happened?
Even if the strong necessity criterion is properly interpreted as a factu-
al inquiry into what actually happened, based on instantiation of the laws of 
nature by the actual conditions in the specific situation, rather than a coun-
45. We use “overdetermination” literally to include situations involving preemptive causation as 
well as duplicative causation. See infra text at note 49; cf. Lewis, supra note 4, at 567, 567 n.12 (same 
usage).
46. Puppe, Der Erfolg, supra note 23, at 868–69, 875, 888–91; Puppe, Concept, supra note 5, at 
76–77, 101–02; Richard W. Wright, Causation in Tort Law, 73 CALIF. L. REV. 1735, 1803–07 (1985) 
[hereinafter Wright, Causation]; Wright, NESS Account, supra note 20, at 286–87, 287 n.14, 304, 308.
47. E.g., DIGEST OF EUROPEAN TORT LAW: ESSENTIAL CASES ON NATURAL CAUSATION 99–100 
(Benedict Winiger et al. eds., 2007) [hereinafter DIGEST]; DAN B. DOBBS, THE LAW OF TORTS 409
(2000); VAN DAM, supra note 6, at 310; MACKIE, supra note 4, at 38–48, 76–77, 126–27; 
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW OF TORTS: LIABILITY FOR PHYSICAL AND EMOTIONAL HARM § 26 
(AM. LAW INST. 2010); VON BAR, supra note 6, at 435 n.1; Fairgrieve & G’sell-Macrez, supra note 1, 
at 117, 120, 129; Lewis, supra note 4, at 557–58; Olivier Moréteau, French Tort Law in the Light of 
European Harmonization, 6 J. CIV. L. STUD. 768, 769 (2013) (noting the proposed use of the strong 
necessity criterion in the Terré draft of proposed revisions in the French civil code, which, like many 
codes, currently contains no criterion for establishing actual causation); Spier & Haazen, supra note 1, 
at 127.
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terfactual inquiry about what might have happened if things had been dif-
ferent, it fails as a comprehensive criterion for identifying causes. It cannot 
properly resolve situations involving duplicative or preemptive causal 
overdetermination. In duplicative causation situations, there are two or 
more distinct (although usually overlapping) fully instantiated minimally 
sufficient sets of conditions, for example, two fires each sufficient without 
the other but in combination with other conditions—such as a house to 
burn, oxygen, a specific wind direction, sufficient fuel on the path between 
the origin of the fire and the house, and lack of adequate countervailing 
rain or fire department efforts—to destroy a house, which merge and de-
stroy the house. In preemptive causation situations, the preemptive cause is 
part of a fully instantiated minimally sufficient set while the preempted 
condition was a member of an incompletely instantiated minimally suffi-
cient set. For example, if the first fire destroys the house before the second 
fire arrives, one of the necessary conditions for a minimally sufficient set 
that includes the second fire (the presence of a house to burn down when 
the second fire arrives) did not exist.49 In either situation, contrary to the 
laws of nature, common sense, and the decisions of the courts,50 neither fire 
would be treated as a cause under the strong necessity criterion, since nei-
ther was strongly necessary given the existence of the other.
Contrary to what proponents of the strong necessity criterion as the 
exclusive criterion often assume,51 instances of overdetermined causation 
are not rare.52 Some of the proponents of the strong necessity criterion as 
the exclusive criterion treat the attributions of legal responsibility in over-
determined causation cases as policy based departures from the usual re-
quirement of a causal connection between the wrongful aspect of the 
defendant’s conduct and the plaintiff’s injury.53 Others have tried to modify 
49. HART & HONORÉ, supra note 4, at 122–28, 206–07, 235–53; Puppe, Der Erfolg, supra note 
23, at 863, 868–70; Puppe, Concept, supra note 5, at 69–70, 78–80; Wright, Causation, supra note 46, 
at 1775–76.
50. E.g., DIGEST, supra note 47, at 269–70, 344–49, 457–543; W. PAGE KEETON ET AL., PROSSER 
AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS 266–67 (5th ed. 1984); infra notes 78, 80, 99, 106 and 115 and 
accompanying text. 
51. E.g., MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.03 cmt. 2 at 259–60 (AM. LAW INST. 1985); VON BAR, supra
note 6, at 440–41; Franz Bydlinski, Causation as a Legal Phenomenon, in CAUSATION IN LAW 7, 20–21 
(Luboš Tichý ed., 2007). 
52. See supra sources cited in note 50.
53. E.g., Clements v. Clements, [2012] 2 S.C.R. 181, 189–91 (Can.); DIGEST, supra note 47, at 
457–58; James Edelman, Unnecessary Causation, 89 AUSTL. L.J. 20, 23, 25–27 (2015); sources cited in 
Wright, Causation, supra note 46, at 1777 n.175, and Wright, Pruning, supra note 32, at 1013 n.60; cf.
Paroline v. United States, 134 S. Ct. 1710, 1724, 1726–27 (2014) (stating that “[i]f the conduct of a 
wrongdoer is neither [strongly] necessary nor [independently strongly] sufficient to produce an out-
come, that conduct cannot in a strict sense be said to have caused the outcome” and describing “alterna-
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the strong necessity criterion to handle these cases. However, as we explain 
in the remainder of this part, none of the modifications are successful.
The most frequent modification is to add details to the description of 
the injury, including not only the time and/or location at which it occurred 
but also tautological references to the causal process by which it occurred. 
For example, in the two-fires situation, the injury is described as the de-
struction of the house (i) at this particular time, (ii) with this particular de-
bris pattern, and/or (iii) by two fires. By describing the injury in this way, 
all of the duplicative conditions become strongly necessary for its occur-
rence; alternatively, the preemptive cause but not the preempted condition 
becomes strongly necessary.54 Such techniques assume the causal conclu-
sion, and then use that assumption to specify the desired level of detail of 
the injury or its manner of occurrence. They could be used to prove that 
anything contributed to the injury, no matter how causally irrelevant, mere-
ly by adding it to the description of the injury (e.g., that the injured person 
was wearing a hat), while ignoring the fact that the added details generally 
are irrelevant to the description of the required legal injury at issue.55
The basic problem with these techniques is that they treat events or 
states of affairs as a whole, which can be described incompletely in almost 
infinitely variable ways, as the entities that are involved in a causal relation 
(the causal relata).56 If someone is asked to describe an event or state of 
affairs in its full concrete detail, she would have to describe the present 
criterion—albeit not sufficiently distinguished from the aggregate strong necessity criterion—to find 
that each individual offender’s possession of images of a child’s sexual abuse was a cause of the emo-
tional and consequent economic harms suffered by the child due to her knowledge of widespread 
possession of those images).
54. E.g., MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.03 cmt. 2 at 259; MACKIE, supra note 4, at 45–46; STEEL,
supra note 1, at 18 (including only the time of occurrence); L.A. Paul, Counterfactual Theories, in
OXFORD HANDBOOK, supra note 3, 158, 178–79; Spier & Haazen, supra note 1, at 128. For especially 
egregious examples of this approach, see Stapleton, Choosing, supra note 40, at 442 n.19 (death “by 
two bullets”), 452 (death “by electrocution at that instant” or “by explosion at 1 a.m.”); Stapleton, 
Extended But-For, supra note 7, at 700 (death “by poison at noon on Friday 13 June 2014 under Dan’s
palm tree”), 704 (same), 710 (death “by a poison”), 711 (time, location, and “debris pattern”), 723–24 
(time, location, and death “by thirst”). Stapleton claims that “the law knows” in hindsight what hap-
pened and how it happened, without explaining how “the law” knows this without relying on the cover-
ing law account of causation. Id. at 703–05, 710–11. Steel claims without elaboration that the NESS 
weak necessity account requires specification of the time of occurrence in preemptive causation situa-
tions. STEEL, supra note 1, at 18 n.16. It does not. See Wright, NESS Account, supra note 20, at 292, 
297–303; Wright, Once More, supra note 5, at 1112–15.
55. Puppe, Der Erfolg, supra note 23, at 870–74; Puppe, Concept, supra note 5, at 73–74, 79–80, 
93–94; Schaffer, Contrastive Causation, supra note 7, at 302–05; Wright, Causation, supra note 46, at 
1777–80.
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state of the whole universe.57 Although many philosophers assume other-
wise,58 causation occurs between specific properties of events and states of 
affairs, rather than between those events or states of affairs as a whole.59 In 
law, the required causal relation is between the wrongful aspect of the de-
fendant’s conduct and the properly described legal injury, which usually 
does not include its specific timing or location. Instead those details serve 
merely to identify the specific event or state of affairs for which causation 
of the legally relevant properties (the required legal injury) is at issue.60
Friedrich Toepel, one of the principal defenders of the strong necessity 
criterion as the exclusive criterion, is perhaps the only one who recognizes 
that one must justify specifying some details of the relevant event or state 
of affairs (such as its timing or location) as part of the relevant legal injury 
while not also specifying others. Thus, he does not apply this approach in 
duplicative causation cases; instead he stands almost alone in heroically 
insisting that none of the duplicative conditions individually was a cause.61
He suggests that all supposed duplicative causation cases might turn out 
upon sufficiently detailed examination to be cases in which one condition 
57. RUDOLF CARNAP, MEANING AND NECESSITY: A STUDY IN SEMANTICS AND MODAL LOGIC 29
(2d ed. 1956) (“If we require of a fact this maximum degree of completeness . . . , then there is only one 
fact, the totality of the actual world, past, present, and future.”).
58. See, e.g., Geert Keil, Making Causal Counterfactuals More Singular, and More Appropriate 
for Use in the Law, in CRITICAL ESSAYS ON “CAUSATION AND RESPONSIBILITY,” supra note 5, 157, 
162; Lewis, supra note 4, at 558; Stathis Psillos, Regularity Theories, in OXFORD HANDBOOK, supra
note 3, 131, 144–50; cf. PAUL & HALL, supra note 38, at 7, 7 nn. 1–3, who state that they do not agree 
that events are the proper causal relata, but nevertheless assume that they are in their subsequent analy-
sis.
59. E.g., TOM L. BEAUCHAMP & ALEXANDER ROSENBERG, HUME AND THE PROBLEM OF 
CAUSATION 251–52, 255–56, 269–75, 281–82 (1981); MACKIE, supra note 4, at 256–58, 260–67; 
Ehring, supra note 23, at 406–07; Richard Fumerton, Moore, Causation, Counterfactuals, and Respon-
sibility, 40 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 1273, 1278 (2003); Thomas Grosse-Wilde, Die Relata eines juristischen 
Kausalbegriffs und der juristische Syllogismus, in JUNGE RECHTSPHILOSOPHIE 43 (Carsten Bäcker & 
Sasha Ziemann eds., 2012); L.A. Paul, Aspect Causation, 97 J. PHIL. 235 (2000), reprinted in
CAUSATION AND COUNTERFACTUALS, supra note 41, 205; Wright, Pruning, supra note 32, at 1033–34,
1033 n.171. After a rigorous review of the various positions, Moore now concedes, contrary to his prior 
arguments, that concrete properties of events and states of affairs rather than events or states of affairs 
as a whole are the causal relata. MOORE, supra note 7, at 361–65, 368 n.61. However, for reasons 
internal to his theory and relying on a misdescription of legal practice, he continues to treat events as 
the relevant causal relata. Id. at 366–68, 395–96; see Wright, NESS Account, supra note 20, at 287 n.9. 
Schaffer, like Moore, is forced to treat events as the causal relata by his contrastive account of causa-
tion. See Schaffer, Contrastive Causation, supra note 7, at 316–17.
60. Grosse-Wilde, supra note 59, at 49–50; Honoré, supra note 35, at 378–79; Puppe, Der Erfolg,
supra note 23, at 878–82, 888–93; Puppe, Concept, supra note 5, at 83–84, 93–94; Puppe, Road Traffic,
supra note 6, at 154; Wright, Causation, supra note 46, at 1759–74; Wright, NESS Account, supra note 
20, at 287 n.9. Steel states that in Germany, if the plaintiff proves that the injury was caused by the 
defendant’s conduct as a whole, the burden is on the defendant to prove as a defense that the injury was 
not caused by the wrongful aspect of the conduct. STEEL, supra note 1, at 41. 
61. Toepel, supra note 42, at 117, 119–20; see also Edelman, supra note 53, at 20, 23, 25–26; 
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caused the relevant legal injury immediately before the other(s) would have 
done so and thus actually involve preemption rather than duplication.62 He 
attempts to rescue the strong necessity criterion in preemptive causation 
cases by specifying the time at which the injury occurred.63 He justifies 
including this detail in the specification of the legal injury by arguing that it 
is an essential aspect in cases of killing or other injuries to person or prop-
erty, for which shortening life or usefulness allegedly is essential.64
Both parts of this argument fail. With respect to duplicative causation, 
consider multiple independently sufficient forces, fires, doses of poison, 
etc. that combine prior to coming into contact with the adversely affected 
person or property. They clearly reinforce rather than preempt each other 
no matter how detailed the description may be. With respect to preemptive 
causation, conditions that cause death or other injuries may well do so at 
the same time or even later than the preempted condition would have done 
so, for example in Karl Engisch’s executioner hypothetical and the much 
discussed situation in which a traveler in the desert dies of thirst rather than 
poisoning when the poison put in his water canteen by one enemy is emp-
tied out by another enemy who is unaware of the poison in the canteen.65
Another popular modification, especially in criminal law, is to apply 
the strong necessity criterion to the competing conditions as an aggregate 
condition. Some, including Mackie, treat the aggregate condition as a cause 
while illogically denying causation by any of the individual included condi-
tions.66 Others illogically treat causation by the aggregate condition as es-
tablishing causation by each included condition.67 In Germany this is 
known as the “formula of alternatives” (Alternativenformel): “Of several 
conditions which can be eliminated separately but not cumulatively without 
the effect failing to occur, each is a cause.”68 Although advertised as an 
extension of the strong necessity criterion, this formulation instead directly 
contradicts it. The formula does not merely allow that the alternative cause 
62. Toepel, supra note 42, at 112.
63. Id. at 120–22; accord STEEL, supra note 1, at 18, 20, 20 n.23. Toepel might also take the 
location of the effect into account in some situations. See Toepel, supra note 42, at 121–22.
64. Toepel, supra note 42, at 120–21.
65. See, e.g., ENGISCH, supra note 39, at 15–16; Puppe, Der Erfolg, supra note 23, at 863, 873–
74; Puppe, Concept, supra note 5, at 107; Wright, Once More, supra note 5, at 1115–20.
66. MACKIE, supra note 4, at 47, apparently approved by Toepel, supra note 42, at 121; cf. Lewis, 
supra note 61, at 80. Steel is willing to adopt the aggregate but-for criterion for overdetermination by 
multiple negative conditions, but not positive ones. See STEEL, supra note 1, at 32, 34.
67. E.g., MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.03 cmt. 2 at 259 (AM. LAW INST. 1985); KEETON ET AL., supra
note 50, at 268–69.
68. This formula was first discussed in LUDWIG TRAEGER, DER KAUSALBEGRIFF IM STRAF UND 
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is not a necessary condition, it prohibits it from being a necessary condi-
tion, to avoid being able to declare every fact as a cause for any event by 
combining it with a fact that is really a cause of it. Furthermore, it fails to 
distinguish instances of duplicative causation from instances of preemptive 
causation (since when lumped together the preemptive and preempted con-
ditions are strongly necessary, while neither is when considered separately) 
and to prevent causally irrelevant conditions from being treated as causally 
relevant when there is causal overdetermination (since the irrelevant condi-
tions are not strongly necessary when considered individually, while the 
aggregate formed by lumping them in with the true causal conditions is 
strongly necessary).69
Some defenders of the strong necessity criterion have stated that, 
when applying it in overdetermined causation situations, you should not 
take into account competing conditions that prevented the condition at is-
sue from being a strongly necessary condition.70 In Germany those using 
this approach refer to the competing conditions, when pre-empted, as “hy-
pothetical,” “reserve,” or “substitute” causes.71 This approach, which oper-
ationally is the same as the aggregate strong necessity analysis discussed in 
the prior paragraph, similarly directly contradicts the strong necessity crite-
rion, assumes the answer to be proved regarding duplicative versus 
preemptive causation, relies on the covering law analysis rather than a 
strong necessity analysis to reach these conclusions, and makes the out-
come of the counterfactual reasoning indeterminate. If the condition at 
issue had not occurred, the causal process involving the competing condi-
tion would have been completed, but that now has also been removed from 
consideration, leaving an often very indeterminate scenario.72
In his counterfactual possible worlds theory, Lewis attempted to deal 
with preemptive causation situations by applying the strong necessity crite-
rion at each step in the actual causal chain between the alleged cause and 
the effect at issue and treating the successful application at each step as 
69. DOBBS, supra note 47, at 417; Puppe, Concept, supra note 5, at 78–79; Toepel, supra note 42, 
at 121; Wright, Causation, supra note 46, at 1780–81.
70. See, e.g., EUROPEAN GROUP ON TORT LAW, PRINCIPLES OF EUROPEAN TORT LAW [PETL]
art. 3:102 at 46 (2005); Stapleton, Choosing, supra note 40, at 441–43 (“duplicate necessity”); Staple-
ton, Extended But-For, supra note 7, at 703–04 (ignoring preempted conditions). Oddly, this analysis 
has been adopted in PETL article 3:102 and section 27 of the Restatement Third despite its obvious 
defects and its failure to capture the proper weak necessity/strong sufficiency criterion that is elaborated 
in the comments to section 27. See infra note 113.
71. See STEEL, supra note 1, at 19 (who suggests that the German courts are implicitly applying 
covering law analysis rather than the strong necessity criterion); Puppe, Der Erfolg, supra note 23, at 
868–69, 888–89.
72. Puppe, Der Erfolg, supra note 23, at 868–70, 888–93; see ENGISCH, supra note 39, at 16–17; 





      05/10/2016   13:13:34
37837-ckt_91-2 Sheet No. 26 Side A      05/10/2016   13:13:34
03 WRIGHT PUPPE-FINAL (DO NOT DELETE) 4/14/2016 7:21 PM
2016] CAUSATION 479
“causal dependence” rather than actual causation, which he states exists 
only if such causal dependence exists at each step, while also relying on 
targeted miracles to avoid backward counterfactual dependence.73 This 
maneuver is, again, an abandonment of the strong necessity criterion and 
instead relies on the covering law analysis to reconstruct the causal chain 
between the condition at issue and the effect. Moreover, while it will work 
in cases of early preemption, in which the competing condition is preempt-
ed prior to the last step in the actual causal chain, it will not work in cases 
of concurrent or late preemption, in which such preemption does not occur 
until the effect has occurred, and it will not work in duplicative causation 
situations.74 Lewis arbitrarily dismisses the duplicative causation situations 
as being “useless as test cases because [we] lack firm naïve opinions about 
them.”75 Although Lewis may not have had firm opinions, almost everyone 
else does and treats each of the duplicative conditions as a cause.
When courts have recognized situations involving causal overdetermi-
nation, they have adopted several different approaches. A few insist on
compliance with the strong necessity criterion and thus erroneously deny 
the existence of actual causation.76 Some attempt to apply the strong neces-
sity condition by detailing the result or aggregating the contributing condi-
tions, as described above.77 Many recognize a condition as a cause if it was 
either strongly necessary or independently strongly sufficient. The inde-
pendently strongly sufficient criterion encompasses situations in which a 
condition is necessary to complete a minimally sufficient set of actual con-
ditions that does not contain any of the competing conditions that prevented 
it from being necessary for the result—for example, each of two fires when 
combined with the other required actual conditions (oxygen, fuel, etc.) but 
not the other fire.78 Unfortunately, most references to the independently 
73. Lewis, supra note 4, at 563, 567; see PAUL & HALL, supra note 38, at 16–17, 43–44.
74. Lewis’s counterfactual possible-worlds theory is thoroughly criticized in MOORE, supra note 
7, at 384–90, 392–425.
75. Lewis, Causation, supra note 4, at 567 n.12; see also Lewis, Causation as Influence, supra
note 61, at 80. 
76. E.g., Burrage v. United States, 134 S. Ct. 881, 887–91 (2014); cf. Price Waterhouse v. Hop-
kins, 490 U.S. 228, 282 (1989) (Kennedy, J., dissenting) (“Any standard less than but-for . . . represents 
a decision to impose liability without causation”); but see Burrage, 134 S. Ct. at 890 (majority opinion)
(dicta indicating possible exceptions); supra note 53 (discussing Paroline v. United States, 134 S. Ct. 
1710 (2014)).
77. See supra text at notes 54–69. 
78. See, e.g., Bundesgerichtshof [BGH] [Federal Court of Justice] 2013, NEUE JURISTISCHE 
WOCHENSCHRIFT [NJW] 2018 (Ger.); Burrage, 134 S. Ct. at 890 (dicta); Paroline v. United States, 134 
S. Ct. 1710, 1723 (2014) (dicta); Kingston v. Chicago & N.W. Ry. Co., 211 N.W. 913, 914 (Wis. 
1927); Sanders v. Am. Body Armor & Equip., Inc., 652 So. 2d 883, 885 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1995); 
DIGEST, supra note 47, at 457–77; HART & HONORÉ, supra note 4, at 122–25, 206–07, 235–53; STEEL,
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strongly sufficient criterion, including those in the first and second Re-
statements of Torts, fail to specify the required complete instantiation of the 
antecedent portion of the relevant causal generalization (and its underlying 
causal laws) that is required for causal sufficiency, rather than mere lawful 
sufficiency, and therefore fail to distinguish preempted conditions from 
duplicative causes.79 For example, if the victim drinks a lethal dose of poi-
son for which there is no antidote, which under the laws of nature guaran-
tees her death within several hours, but her head is chopped off by an axe 
wielder while the poison is still working its way through her system, the 
antecedent portion of the death by bleeding causal generalization was fully 
instantiated, while the antecedent portion of the death by poisoning causal 
generalization was not.
Other courts, primarily in common law jurisdictions, employ unde-
fined and unelaborated phrases such as “substantial factor,” “material con-
tribution,” “common sense causation,” or merely “contributed” or “caused” 
to identify as causes conditions that fail to satisfy the strong necessity crite-
rion due to causal overdetermination.80 These phrases are of no help in 
resolving the causation issue but rather are merely labels applied to an un-
explained conclusion. The words “factor,” “contribution,” and “causation” 
merely restate the causal issue. The “substantial,” “material,” and “com-
mon sense” qualifiers only make things worse by adding tests of signifi-
cance that confuse the  causation issue with the normative responsibility 
79. RESTATEMENT OF THE LAW OF TORTS § 432 (AM. LAW INST. 1934); RESTATEMENT 
(SECOND) OF THE LAW OF TORTS § 432 (AM. LAW INST. 1965). Section 432 also erroneously treats 
multiple “sufficient” conditions as causes only if all of the conditions were actively operating and 
“sufficient.” Id.; see Wright, Once More, supra note 5, at 1097–1101. For further discussion of the 
critical difference between causal sufficiency and mere lawful sufficiency, see NESS Account, supra
note 20, at 289, 297–303. The failure to distinguish mere lawful “guarantee” sufficiency from complete-
instantiation causal sufficiency has been a major defect in Stapleton’s work. See id. at 298–99. In her 
most recent paper, she attempts to distinguish the two types of situations by including legally irrelevant 
details in the description of the relevant injury. Stapleton, Extended But-For, supra note 7, at 723–24; 
see supra note 54 and accompanying text.
80. For cases employing “material contribution,” see, e.g., Bonnington Castings v. Wardlaw, 
[1956] AC 613 (HL) 621 (Eng.); Williams v. Bermuda Hosps. Bd., [2016] UKPC 4 at ¶¶ 26–35, 41–43 
(Brit. Commonwealth); March v. E. & M.H. Stramare Pty. Ltd., (1991) 171 CLR 506, 530–32 (Austl.) 
(also “common sense”); Athey v. Leonati, [1996] 3 S.C.R. 458 (Can.); Sew Hoy & Sons Ltd. v. Coop-
ers & Lybrand, [1996] 1 NZLR 392 (N.Z.); Bailey v. Ministry of Defence, [2008] EWCA (Civ) 883 
(Eng.). For cases employing “substantial factor” see, e.g., Anderson v. Minneapolis, St. P. & Sault Ste. 
Marie Ry. Co., 179 N.W. 45, 46 (Minn. 1920), overruled in part on other grounds by Borsheim v. Great 
N. Ry. Co., 183 N.W. 519, 521 (Minn. 1921) (upholding liability based on a finding that the defend-
ant’s fire was a “material element” in the destruction of the plaintiff’s property); Mitchell v. Gonzales,
819 P.2d 872, 878–79 (Cal. 1991). For cases employing “common sense” inferences of causation see, 
e.g., March, supra; Clements v. Clements, [2012] 2 S.C.R. 181, 187–89, 192–96 (Can.). Moore builds 
his causal theory, which encompasses attributable responsibility as well as causation, around a primitiv-
ist singularist interpretation of the “substantial factor” formula. See Wright, Causation: Metaphysics or 
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issue.81 Courts in civil law jurisdictions generally employ unexplained and 
unelaborated findings or presumptions of causation or, usually to the same 
effect, reverse the burden of proof.82
B. Weak Necessity / Strong Sufficiency
Likely as a result of their need to focus on specific instances of causa-
tion and their related exposure to recurring instances of overdetermined 
causation, legal theorists, rather than non-legal philosophers, have led the 
way in pointing out the inadequacy of the strong necessity criterion and 
related counterfactual theories and developing, instead, a comprehensive 
covering law account that encompasses the strong necessity criterion and 
the independently strongly sufficient criterion but goes beyond both to 
properly resolve the causation issue in all instances.
Karl Engisch, in a short monograph published in 1931, seems to have 
been the first to reject the strong necessity criterion as an exclusive criteri-
on in favor of the more comprehensive covering law analysis.83 Using 
preemptive causation situations, he demonstrated the tautological and cir-
cular nature of attempting to detail the result to reach the correct causal 
conclusion when using the strong necessity criterion.84 The following for-
mulation by Engisch is still often cited in the German criminal law litera-
ture:
An act—we initially only consider an actual doing—is only to be con-
sidered as being causal for a specific outcome when it is directly and 
through general laws of nature connected to every event following the 
act in a chronological order that occurred as a result of the act and the 
thereon following events that have materialized in any part of the facts of 
the case that are prohibited by law.85
However, Engisch did not determine the logical form of the relation 
between a cause and the effect. German scholars, therefore, while praising 
Engisch for the theoretical superiority of his understanding of causation 
81. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW OF TORTS: LIABILITY FOR PHYSICAL AND EMOTIONAL 
HARM § 26 cmt. j & reporters’ note (AM. LAW INST. 2010); Wright, Causation, supra note 46, at 1781–
84; Wright, Once More, supra note 5, at 1075–80.
82. See DIGEST, supra note 47, at 256, 347–49, 457–543; STEEL, supra note 1, at 19, 23; VAN 
DAM, supra note 6, at 324–27, 329–32; Fairgrieve & G’sell-Macrez, supra note 1, at 123–24, 126–27; 
Spier & Haazen, supra note 1, at 146–47.
83. ENGISCH, supra note 39, at 14.
84. Id. at 15–16; see supra text at notes 54–65.





      05/10/2016   13:13:34
37837-ckt_91-2 Sheet No. 27 Side B      05/10/2016   13:13:34
03 WRIGHT PUPPE-FINAL (DO NOT DELETE) 4/14/2016 7:21 PM
482 CHICAGO-KENT LAW REVIEW [Vol 91:2
over the strong necessity criterion, generally have continued to insist upon 
the strong necessity criterion as the supposed exclusive criterion.86
In 1959, Herbert Hart and Tony Honoré published their monumental 
treatise, Causation in the Law.87 Like Engisch, they recognized that more 
than one set of minimally sufficient conditions for a specific consequence 
could be (and frequently is) instantiated in a specific situation.88 Relying on 
and extending Mill’s covering law analysis,89 they employed the least 
stringent, weak sense of necessity to identify “causally relevant factors” in 
a specific situation: “A condition may be necessary just in the sense that it 
is one of a set of conditions jointly sufficient for the production of the con-
sequence: it is necessary because it is required to complete this set.”90 This 
can also be described as a strong sense of sufficiency, contrasted with a 
strict sense that requires that the condition at issue be sufficient by itself for 
the consequence (which is never true) and a weak sense that requires that it 
merely be part of a sufficient set (which would allow anything, no matter 
how irrelevant, to be treated as a cause by adding it to an already sufficient 
set).91
Hart and Honoré’s weak necessity definition of a “causally relevant 
factor” was a major advance in the analysis of causation, in both law and 
philosophy.92 However, the potential clarifying impact of their analysis was 
seriously blunted by several aspects of their discussion. Most significantly, 
their analysis of causally relevant factors was only a preliminary step, not 
even mentioned in the introduction to their book, in pursuit of their primary 
project, which was an unsuccessful attempt to use ordinary language analy-
sis to identify supposedly factual, non-normative causal criteria, applicable 
in non-legal as well as legal contexts, for treating only one or a few of the 
many causally relevant factors in a specific situation as causes.93 This pri-
86. Noted, critically, by Puppe, Concept, supra note 5, at 69–70, 70 n.3. See infra text at notes 
95–96.
87. H.L.A. HART & A.M. HONORÉ, CAUSATION IN THE LAW (1959); see also Tony Honoré, Die 
Kausalitätslehre im anglo-amerikanischen Recht im Vergleich zum deutschen Recht, 69 ZSTW 465 
(1957).
88. HART & HONORÉ, supra note 4, at 20, 112–13.
89. Id. at 15–22, 111–13. Although they were aware of Engisch’s prior work, they only men-
tioned it in a footnote toward the end of their treatise. Id. at 435 n.18 (1st ed. 384 n.4).
90. Id. at 112–13.
91. Wright, Pruning, supra note 32, at 1020; see MACKIE, supra note 4, at 38–40; Puppe, Der 
Erfolg, supra note 23, at 865–69, 875–76. 
92. See, e.g., Phillipa Foot, Hart and Honoré: Causation in the Law, 72 PHIL. REV. 505–15 
(1963); M.P. Golding, Causation in the Law, 59 J. PHIL. 85 (1962); D.D. Raphael, Causation in the 
Law, 37 PHIL. 83 (1962).
93. HART & HONORÉ, supra note 4, at 1–6, 11–13, 23–108, which is criticized in Haskell Fain, 
Hart and Honoré on Causation in the Law, 9 INQUIRY 322 (1966); Richard W. Wright, The Nightmare 





      05/10/2016   13:13:34
37837-ckt_91-2 Sheet No. 28 Side A      05/10/2016   13:13:34
03 WRIGHT PUPPE-FINAL (DO NOT DELETE) 4/14/2016 7:21 PM
2016] CAUSATION 483
mary focus overwhelmed and sometimes distorted their analysis of causally 
relevant factors, which received minimal notice in the legal literature, and 
instead promoted further confusion by courts, lawyers, and philosophers of 
the distinct issues of causation and responsibility.94
In the early 1980s, we each began writing (in different languages and 
with different doctrinal backgrounds and thus until recently unaware of 
each other’s work) a series of papers criticizing the strong necessity criteri-
on and instead insisting on the covering law theory’s weak necessity/strong 
sufficiency criterion. In 1980, Ingeborg Puppe, referencing Engisch’s work 
but being unaware of Hart and Honoré’s and Mackie’s work, drew on 
Hempel and Oppenheim’s deductive-nomological theory of causal explana-
tions in the philosophy of science95 to supply what Engisch had not: a spec-
ification of the proper logical form of a causal condition, which is weak 
necessity/strong sufficiency. As Puppe often puts it, a cause is a necessary 
element of a true causal explanation of the result according to causal 
laws.96 In 1985, Richard Wright sought to revive, clarify, correct and ex-
tend Hart and Honoré’s weak necessity analysis of causally relevant fac-
tors, which he called “NESS” (necessary element of a sufficient set)
conditions, while rejecting Hart and Honoré’s attempt to treat only some of 
the causally relevant factors as causes.97
The weak necessity criterion underlies—and is relied upon when em-
ploying—both the strong necessity criterion and the independently strongly 
sufficient criterion. Each is merely a corollary of the weak necessity crite-
rion that works only in certain situations. The strong necessity criterion 
works only if there was a single minimally sufficient set of actual condi-
tions in the specific situation, in which case every condition that was neces-
sary for the complete instantiation of that set was also necessary for the 
result. The independently strongly sufficient criterion encompasses situa-
tions in which a condition is necessary to complete a minimally sufficient 
set that does not contain any of the competing conditions that prevented it 
from being strongly necessary. Both criterions are only special cases of 
weak necessity/strong sufficiency. When there is duplicative overdetermi-
HART: LEGAL, POLITICAL, AND MORAL PHILOSOPHY 165 (Matthew Kramer et al. eds., 2008) [hereinaf-
ter Wright, Noble Dream].
94. Wright, Causation, supra note 46, at 1745–50, 1788, 1788 n.227; Wright, Noble Dream,
supra note 93.
95. Carl G. Hempel & Paul Oppenheim, Studies in the Logic of Explanation, 15 PHIL. SCI. 135 
(1948); see Puppe, Concept, supra note 5, at 72–73.
96. Puppe, Der Erfolg, supra note 23, at 869–70, 875, 876–78, 888–94; Puppe, Concept, supra
note 5, at 72–73.
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nation by independently strongly sufficient conditions (e.g., two or more 
“independently sufficient” fires), you can formulate two or more minimally 
sufficient sets of conditions, each of which contains only one of the com-
peting conditions (fires) in addition to the other required conditions, some 
of which (e.g., oxygen, dry fuel, and an existing property to burn down) 
will be common to each minimally sufficient set.98
Going beyond prior discussions of the weak necessity (strong suffi-
ciency) criterion, which only encompassed conditions that were strongly 
necessary or independently strongly sufficient, we each have noted that the 
weak necessity criterion is able to recognize as causes conditions that were 
neither strongly necessary nor independently strongly sufficient but were 
strongly sufficient when included in a minimally sufficient set containing 
one or more other conditions of the same type. Consider, for example, the 
casting of three individual affirmative votes when only two were necessary 
for approval of some action, or three sources of force, fire, water, noise or 
other type of condition, each of size X, which combine to produce an indi-
visible injury for the occurrence of which only 2X amount was necessary. 
Employing the weak necessity analysis, each of the affirmative votes or 
sources can properly be identified as a cause of the relevant legal injury by 
including it and either one of the other two affirmative votes or sources in a 
completely instantiated minimally sufficient set that does not include the 
third affirmative vote or source.99
Wright argues that the weak necessity analysis can and should be em-
ployed to recognize even more conditions as causes. For example, assume 
there were only two voters, X with the right to cast 2N votes and Y with the 
right to cast only N votes, who each cast their votes in the affirmative when 
2N affirmative votes were necessary and sufficient for approval of an ac-
tion detrimental to the plaintiff, or two simultaneously operative sources of 
force, fire, water, noise, toxin, etc., X of size 2N and Y of size N, when 
amount 2N was necessary and sufficient for the plaintiff’s suffering of an 
indivisible injury. In each case, X’s contribution was both strongly neces-
sary and independently strongly sufficient and thus clearly was a cause. Y’s 
98. See supra text at notes 78–79.
99. See Ingeborg Puppe, Entscheidungsanmerkung zu BGHSt 37,107 [1992] JURISTISCHE 
RUNDSCHAU 30, 32; Puppe, Concept, supra note 5, at 98; Wright, Causation, supra note 46, at 1791–
93. Honoré has noted, without any explanation, that such conditions could be causes. A.M. Honoré, 
Causation and Remoteness of Damage, in 11 INTERNATIONAL ENCYCLOPEDIA OF COMPARATIVE LAW,
TORTS 7-107, 7-108, 7-115, 7-121 (André Tunc ed., 1983). For examples of such situations, which are 
not rare, see, e.g., Bundesgerichtshof [BGH] [Federal Court of Justice] 1990, NEUE JURISTISCHE 
WOCHENSCHRIFT [NJW] 2560, 2566 (Ger.) (votes); Warren v. Parkhurst, 92 N.Y.S. 725 (Sup. Ct. 
1904), aff’d, 93 N.Y.S. 1009 (App. Div. 1905), aff’d, 78 N.E. 579 (N.Y. 1906) (pollution); DIGEST,





      05/10/2016   13:13:34
37837-ckt_91-2 Sheet No. 29 Side A      05/10/2016   13:13:34
03 WRIGHT PUPPE-FINAL (DO NOT DELETE) 4/14/2016 7:21 PM
2016] CAUSATION 485
contribution, although neither strongly necessary, independently strongly 
sufficient, nor, apparently, even strongly sufficient (necessary to complete 
a minimally sufficient set which may include other conditions of the same 
type), can be shown to be strongly sufficient (and thus a cause) by includ-
ing it in a minimally sufficient set that also includes X’s contribution de-
scribed as “at least size N.” When compared to the situations discussed in 
the prior paragraph, it cannot possibly matter, from the perspective of sci-
entific/natural/actual causation, which person or source supplied the vari-
ous votes or amounts of force, fire, water, noise, toxin, etc.100
Puppe disagrees. She insists on applying the weak necessity criterion 
to each actual condition in a specific situation and is unwilling to apply the 
“at least” descriptive technique to X’s conduct or activity to enable treating 
Y’s conduct or activity as a cause. Instead, she argues that the “at least” 
descriptive technique should be used to describe the relevant abstract con-
dition in the causal law to enable (i) (similar to Mackie) X’s conduct or 
activity to be treated as an instantiation of that abstract condition even if it 
was quantitatively greater than the amount necessary for such instantiation, 
(ii) multiple actual conditions each of which is by itself insufficient for 
such instantiation to be treated as causes, but not to allow (iii) any actual 
condition which was not by itself sufficient for such instantiation to be 
treated as a cause when there is another actual condition that by itself was 
sufficient.101
The use of subsets and/or “at least” descriptions of actual conditions to 
make up a minimally sufficient set of actual conditions in a specific in-
stance has been challenged by some as supposedly assuming that the omit-
ted conditions or their more-than-at-least properties did not exist. This is 
not true; rather, they simply are not included in the actual conditions cho-
sen to make up the specified minimally sufficient set. Their actual exist-
ence outside of the specified set must be considered to make sure that they 
did not prevent the complete instantiation of the specified set by preventing 
the instantiation of one or more of its required elements.102
100. Wright, Causation, supra note 46, at 1793–94; Wright, Pruning, supra note 32, at 1035–39. If 
Y’s contribution is trivial in comparison to X’s, liability generally will be denied due to a non-causal 
normative limitation on attributable responsibility. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW OF TORTS:
LIABILITY FOR PHYSICAL AND EMOTIONAL HARM § 36 (AM. LAW INST. 2010); Wright, Legal Respon-
sibility, supra note 6, at 1448–50, 1450 n.84.
101. See MACKIE, supra note 4, at 43–44, 65, 153, 265; Puppe, Der Elforg, supra note 23, at 883–
95.
102. Wright, Causation, supra note 46, at 1793–94; Wright, NESS Account, supra note 20, at 304; 
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Nevertheless, especially when “at least” descriptions of some condi-
tions are used to allow other conditions to be recognized as causes, the 
weak necessity criterion may be too conceptually complex to be applied 
directly to singular instances in actual practice.103 This difficulty is most 
apparent in the frequent situations in which multiple sources of unknown 
size combine to cause some effect, as in the two cases most often cited 
(erroneously) in the United States as supposed examples of causation by 
multiple independently sufficient conditions, Anderson v. Minneapolis, St. 
Paul & Sault Ste. Marie Railway Co.104 and Corey v. Havener.105 In these 
two cases, the courts did not require proof—and it is doubtful that it could 
have been proved—that the defendant’s tortious conduct was strongly nec-
essary, independently strongly sufficient, or even strongly sufficient, but 
rather merely that it was a “substantial factor” (Anderson) or “contributed” 
to the injury (Corey).106 Similarly, it often will be difficult to prove, even 
using the weak necessity criterion with the subset or “at least” descriptive 
technique, that one reason among many for some decision or action was a 
cause.107
Wright argues that the conceptual complexities can be avoided and the 
informational difficulties greatly reduced by applying the weak necessity 
criterion only to the construction of causal laws as minimally sufficient sets 
of abstract conditions, while treating any actual condition that was a coher-
ent part of the complete instantiation of the antecedent portion of a relevant 
causal law in a specific situation as a cause of the instantiated consequent 
portion, even if the abstract condition that it helped to instantiate was over-
instantiated.108 To be a coherent part of the complete instantiation it must 
103. See, e.g., DOBBS, supra note 47, at 417; SARAH GREEN, CAUSATION IN NEGLIGENCE 22–23 
(2015); Bagshaw, supra note 23, at 367–69; Mark Kelman, The Necessary Myth of Objective Causation 
Judgments in Liberal Political Theory, 63 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 579, 606–08 (1987); Wright, Once More,
supra note 5, at 1107–09.
104. Anderson v. Minneapolis, St. Paul & Sault Ste. Marie Ry. Co., 179 N.W. 45, 46 (Minn. 1920)
(destruction of property by two independently initiated fires) (see supra note 80).
105. Corey v. Havener, 65 N.E. 69 (Mass. 1902) (startling of a horse by two independently operat-
ed motorcycles).
106. Anderson, 179 N.W. at 46; Corey, 65 N.E. at 69; see Wright, Legal Responsibility, supra note 
1, at 1442–43. Such situations occur often. See, e.g., Hotson v. East Berkshire Health Authority, [1987] 
AC 750 (HL) (Eng.); Williams v. Bermuda Hosp. Bd., [2016] UKPC 4 (Brit. Commonwealth); Bailey 
v. Ministry of Defence, [2008] EWCA (Civ) 883 (Eng.); Clements v. Clements, [2012] 2 S.C.R. 181 
(Can.); Burrage v. United States, 134 S. Ct. 881, 890 (2014); Paroline v. United States, 134 S. Ct. 1710, 
1732 (2014); Tidal Oil Co. v. Pease, 5 P.2d 389 (Okla. 1931); DIGEST, supra note 47, at 347–48; 
TSACHI KEREN-PAZ, SEX TRAFFICKING: A PRIVATE LAW RESPONSE (2013); David A. Fischer, Insuffi-
cient Causes, 94 KY. L.J. 277, 87, 287 n.45, 289–90 (2006); Spier & Haazen, supra note 1, at 146–47.
107. See supra note 103.
108. Wright, Once More, supra note 5, at 1107–09; Wright, NESS Account, supra note 20, at 291; 
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be consistent with the other required conditions. For example, a second fire 
that arrived after the house had already burnt down would not be consistent 
with the requirement that there be a house to burn down when the fire ar-
rives at the location of the house. This less stringent way of understanding 
and applying the weak necessity criterion in overdetermined causation 
situations is consistent in result with the direct application of the criterion 
to the actual conditions in the specific situation using “at least” descriptions 
of some of those conditions. However, it is more transparent and simple to 
use, while also enabling one to reach the correct causal conclusion in cases 
like Anderson and Corey in which it cannot be proved that a condition was 
strongly necessary or strongly sufficient but it nevertheless clearly contrib-
uted. Similarly, to establish that some information contributed to a specific 
decision, it need only be established that the information was considered by 
the subject and counted positively in favor of the decision; if so, it was part 
of the complete instantiation of a minimally sufficient set of reasons for 
that decision.109
Puppe continues to insist that the weak necessity criterion be applied 
directly to the actual conditions in the specific situation. She suggests that, 
in cases where we cannot figure out the exact amount of a minimal suffi-
cient condition for an effect and therefore have to work with “at least” de-
scriptions, the “at least” descriptions should be put into the causal law to 
avoid distinguishing, in our application of the weak necessity criterion, 
109. Wright, NESS Account, supra note 20, at 303–05, 307–09; Wright, Once More, supra note 5, 
at 1107–09; Wright, Pruning, supra note 32, at 1037–39. Wright believes that mental processes are 
physical processes and thus subject to causal laws, but are much less observably regular and predictable 
than more obvious types of physical processes. Because humans learn from prior experiences and new 
information, their reasoning is goal directed (thus preserving free will), the range of relevant conditions 
is much broader, and the applicable causal generalizations are much more complex and less well under-
stood. Wright, NESS Account, supra note 20, at 307–09; Wright, Pruning, supra note 32, at 1037; 
accord, CARNAP, supra note 39, at 216–22. Even if mental (and other) physical processes at the ele-
mentary particle/wave level are probabilistic, as modern science generally assumes, they are only 
partially rather than completely undetermined. In a completely indeterministic world, in which nothing 
was (weakly or strongly) necessary or sufficient for anything else, unpredictable chaos would reign and 
the concepts of causation and probability likely would not exist. Our world is at most only partially 
indeterministic—that is, probabilistic. The covering law account of causation continues to apply in a 
partially indeterministic world. See id. at 217, 221–22; MACKIE, supra note 4, at 49–50, 76, 237–47; 
Wright, Pruning, supra note 32, at 1028–29, 1029 n.145, 1042–49; Wright, NESS Account, at 309–11. 
Puppe believes that mental processes are not subject to causal laws and that to treat them as being 
subject to causal laws would be contrary to the free will postulate. She argues that we are not entitled to 
postulate psychological causal laws which we neither know nor are able to prove. She proposes a 
different concept of causation of mental processes, above all human decisions, based on reasons instead 
of natural conditions. But she thereby comes to the same result as Wright does: to cause a person’s
decision means to give her reasons for this decision which she accepts, even if she also has other rea-
sons for it. Ingeborg Puppe, Der objektive Tatbestand der Anstiftung, GA 101, 108–10 (1984); see
HART AND HONORÉ, supra note 4, at xxxvii, 2, 22–23, 55–61; Bagshaw, supra note 23, at 375–76; 
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between the causal law and its application in a single case and thereby giv-
ing up the direct application of the logical form of the weak necessity crite-
rion as a requirement for a condition to be a cause in a single case. She 
acknowledges that this approach is imprecise since we do not thereby get a 
minimally sufficient set of actual conditions in the single case, and that we 
must be aware of this in cases where different actors contribute to the 
amount for which we only give an “at least” description. However, she
notes, if only one person provides this amount, that would not cause a fail-
ure, because the minimal sufficient amount is contained in the “at least” 
description. Wright observes that this approach will not help in cases like 
Anderson and Corey, for which we do not know the actual or relative sizes 
of the distinct contributions.
The weak necessity criterion, including its application to conditions 
that were neither strongly necessary nor independently strongly sufficient, 
has been generally accepted as a major improvement over the strong neces-
sity criterion by legal academics in common law jurisdictions110 and in-
creasingly in other jurisdictions as it has become better known,111 although 
some have questioned Wright’s claim to have captured, non-circularly, the 
essence of the concept of causation and/or its application in some situa-
tions, especially overdetermined negative causation situations.112 It has 
110. See, e.g., STEEL, supra note 1, at 25–33; Schaffer, Contrastive Causation in the Law, supra
note 36, at 285; Stapleton, Causation in the Law, supra note 3, at 765–67; Gemma Turton, Using NESS 
to Overcome the Confusion Created by the ‘Material Contribution to Harm’ Test for Causation in 
Negligence, 30 J. PROF. NEGL. 50 (2014); Euan West, The Utility of the NESS Test of Factual Causa-
tion in Scots Law, 4 ABERDEEN STUDENT L. REV. 39, 47 (2013); authors cited in Wright, NESS Ac-
count, supra note 20, at 285 n.1. Those who claim to be applying some modification or extension of the 
strong necessity criterion rely, explicitly or implicitly, on the weak necessity covering law account. See, 
e.g., GREEN, supra note 103, at 13–14 (who, as STEEL, supra note 1, at 34 n.81 has noted, needs to rely 
on the NESS weak necessity criterion or some similar criterion to determine whether a condition was 
“operative”); Stapleton, Choosing, supra note 40, at 474 (stating that the NESS weak necessity criterion 
best elaborates her concept of “involvement,” including “necessity” and “duplicate necessity” as well as 
“contribution”). In her most recent paper, Stapleton defines a condition as a cause of some phenomenon 
“only if, but for that factor alone, (i) the phenomenon would not exist or (ii) an actual contribution to an 
element of the positive requirements for the existence of the phenomenon would not exist”). Stapleton, 
Extended But-For, supra note 7, at 713. Part (ii) is viciously circular, incomplete and murky. It fails to 
define “contribution” or to require instantiation of all “the requirements for the existence of the phe-
nomenon,” and her discussion of its application to deny causation by negative conditions that are not 
strongly necessary is not forensically friendly, persuasive or consistent. See id. at 714–23; STEEL, supra 
note 1, at 25, 35–36.
111. E.g., Federico Stella, La vitalità del modello della sussunzione sotto leggi. A confronto il 
pensiero di Wright e Mackie, in I SAPERI DEL GIUDICE. LA CAUSALITÀ E IL RAGIONEVOLE DUBBIO 1–
70 (Federico Stella ed., 2004) (English translation by Federico Stella is available at 
http://works.bepress.com/richard_wright/34); Märten Schultz, Further Ruminations on Cause-In-Fact,
41 SCANDINAVIAN STUD. L. 467, 485 (2001). Toepel, supra note 42, at 121–30 misunderstands the 
application of the NESS criterion in singular instances and treats causal chain analysis as singularist 
rather than as an application of covering laws.
112. The circularity objection is discussed and rejected in Wright, NESS Account, supra note 20, at 
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been adopted in the Restatement (Third) of Torts as the correct analysis of 
causation, but the black letter sections fail to capture it accurately and thus 
continue to be unable to distinguish between duplicative and preemptive 
causation situations, and the comments, which rely upon it, fail to empha-
size the required complete instantiation sense of sufficiency.113 Although 
the courts generally continue to resort to conclusory, unelaborated, and 
unexplained findings of causation when the strong necessity criterion erro-
neously fails to identify causation, often using phrases such as “substantial 
factor” or “material contribution” or unexplained presumptions,114 few as 
yet have been made aware of the weak necessity criterion. When aware of 
and properly understanding it, the courts have generally accepted or at least 
relied upon it.115
V. PROVING CAUSATION
Proof of a singular instance of causation requires proof of (1) a scien-
tifically valid causal law or generalization (the abstract “general causation” 
or causal capacity issue), and (2) complete instantiation of the allegedly 
relevant causal generalization and its underlying causal laws in the specific 
situation (the concrete “specific causation” issue). General causation is 
usually assumed, without requiring any proof, in traditional crash-bash-
ciled in Puppe & Wright, supra note †, pt. III.D (agreeing that only the condition(s) that first irrevoca-
bly guaranteed the failure of a preventive causal process was (were) causes of its failure and of the 
unprevented causal process that was enabled by its failure).
113. Section 27, titled “Multiple Sufficient Causes,” states: “If multiple acts occur, each of which 
under § 26 alone would have been a factual cause of the physical harm at the same time in the absence 
of the other act(s), each act is regarded as a factual cause of the harm.” RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE 
LAW OF TORTS: LIABILITY FOR PHYSICAL AND EMOTIONAL HARM § 27 (AM. LAW INST. 2010). Section 
26 states the strong necessity (“but for”) criterion for a condition to be a factual cause. Id. § 26. Section 
27 was meant to encapsulate the weak necessity/strong sufficiency criterion that is employed in id. § 26 
cmts. c, d, i & k and § 27 cmts. a, b, e, f, g, h & i and related reporters’ notes. Instead it states an am-
biguous modified strong necessity criterion. Id. § 27. In addition to its ambiguous reference to “at the 
same time” and its limitation to “acts” which “occur” and cause “physical” harm, section 27, like 
subsection 432(2) of the Restatement Second, would treat preempted conditions as causes and mishan-
dles many cases of duplicative causation. See supra text accompanying notes 66–72 and 79. The Re-
statement Third attempts to paper over some of these defects in comments that limit section 27 to 
duplicative causation situations, without providing any criteria for distinguishing the two types of 
situations, and that refer preemptive causation situations to supposed resolution by section 26’s strong 
necessity criterion, which, however, cannot properly resolve such situations. See id. § 26 cmt. k, § 27 
cmts. e and h.
114. See supra notes 80–82 and accompanying text.
115. See, e.g., Paroline v. United States, 134 S. Ct. 1710, 1723–27 (2014) (discussed supra note 
53); United States v. Kearney, 672 F.3d 81, 98 (1st Cir. 2012) (accepting the weak necessity criterion to 
find causation in a similar child pornography restitution case); June v. Union Carbide Corp., 577 F.3d 
1234, 1253 (10th Cir. 2009) (accepting the weak necessity criterion but finding it was not satisfied in 
the particular case); Amaca Pty Ltd v. Booth, [2011] 246 CLR 36, ¶¶ 48, 53, 70 (Austl.); Allianz Aus-
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slash situations, but it has become a subject of major contention in modern 
tort cases involving, for example, toxic or carcinogenic substances, in 
which the relevant causal laws often are much less well understood and 
even doubted as being deterministic.116
A significant statistical correlation between the occurrences of two 
different conditions is an indication, but never by itself sufficient proof, 
that they are connected as abstract elements in a causal law. It may instead 
be a spurious correlation between the nodes of an epiphenomenal relation, 
each due to a common cause, or an accidental, non-causally related correla-
tion. Before concluding that a general causal relation exists between condi-
tions of type A and B, scientists generally require, in addition to a strong, 
consistent, specific, coherent, graded-to-exposure, testable statistical asso-
ciation, that A occur before B, that there be some scientifically plausible 
explanation or hypothesis regarding how A causes B, and that other possi-
ble explanations for the correlation be ruled out.117
As Mill emphasized, we rarely, if ever, will have complete knowledge 
of the relevant causal laws and actual conditions in a specific situation. 
Instead, we employ causal generalizations, which lump together at a macro 
level, with very incomplete specification, a large number of underlying 
causal laws at the micro level. Since a causal generalization is not a com-
plete specification of the underlying causal laws, proof of instantiation of 
even all of the antecedent conditions in the causal generalization provides 
only an aggregate class-based statistical probability that the underlying 
causal laws were completely instantiated and, thus, that the condition at 
issue actually was a cause of the relevant consequence. Nevertheless, the 
proven actual conditions in the specific situation, when considered in light 
of alternative causal stories, may provide sufficient direct and circumstan-
tial evidence regarding instantiation of the network of causal processes in 
the specific situation to warrant the formation of a belief, rather than a mere 
class-based statistical probability, that a specific causal generalization and 
its underlying causal laws were instantiated in the specific situation.118
116. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW OF TORTS: LIABILITY FOR PHYSICAL AND 
EMOTIONAL HARM § 28 cmt. c (AM. LAW INST. 2010); STEEL, supra note 1, at 76.
117. See SUSAN HAACK, EVIDENCE MATTERS: SCIENCE, PROOF, AND TRUTH IN THE LAW 239–63 
(2014); STEEL, supra note 1, at 68–75; Austin Bradford Hill, The Environment and Disease: Associa-
tion or Causation?, 58 PROC. ROYAL SOC. MED. 295 (1965); Symposium on Legal and Scientific Per-
spectives on Causation in Mass Tort Litigation, 1 COURTS, HEALTH SCI. & L. 287, 292–93 (1991).
118. See HAACK, supra note 117, at 17–19, 52–56, 60–61; Wright, Pruning, supra note 32, at 
1044–54; Richard W. Wright, Proving Causation: Probability versus Belief, in PERSPECTIVES ON 
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The required warranted degree of belief in criminal cases is now gen-
erally acknowledged to be “beyond a reasonable doubt” in common law 
jurisdictions and the same or “a virtual certainty” in civil law jurisdictions. 
There is much less agreement on the required warranted degree of belief in 
civil cases. In all common law jurisdictions, some civil law jurisdictions
(e.g., China, Italy, Switzerland, and Thailand), and “mixed” (e.g., Scandi-
navian) jurisdictions, the standard of persuasion in civil litigation is stated 
to be much lower than in criminal litigation: at best, a bare minimal belief, 
despite perhaps substantial doubts, described as a “preponderance of the 
evidence” in the United States and some civil law jurisdictions and as a 
“balance of probability” in the British Commonwealth and Scandinavia.119
In many civil law jurisdictions, the academic doctrine considers the re-
quired warranted degree of belief in civil cases to be the same high stand-
ard as in criminal cases, although the civil codes generally merely require 
119. See, e.g., Y v. Norway, 2003-II Eur. Ct. H.R. 161, 163,
http://echr.coe.int/Documents/Reports_Recueil_2003-II.pdf (affirming civil liability under Norway’s
“balance of probability” standard after acquittal under the “reasonable doubt” standard for criminal 
liability); OBLIGATIONENRECHT, CODE DES OBLIGATIONS, CODICE DELLE OBBLIGAZIONI [Code of
Obligations] Jan. 1, 2014, RO 220, art. 53 (Switz.) (“When determining fault or lack of fault and capac-
ity or incapacity to consent, the court is not bound by the provisions governing criminal capacity nor by 
any acquittal in the criminal court. The civil court is likewise not bound by the verdict in the criminal 
court when determining fault and assessing compensation.”); Wright, Proving Causation, supra note 
118, at 195–96. In Thailand, sentence two of article 227 of the Criminal Procedure Code states: “Where 
any reasonable doubt exists as to whether or not the accused has committed the offence, the benefit of 
doubt shall be given to him.” CRIM. PROC. CODE § 227 [p. 87] (Thail.), 
http://www.imolin.org/doc/amlid/Thailand_Criminal%20Procedure%20Code.pdf. In contrast, arti-
cle 104 of the Civil Procedure Code of Thailand states, “The Court shall have full power to decide 
whether the evidence as adduced by the parties is relevant to the issue and is sufficient to be taken as 
conclusive or not and then to give judgment accordingly.” CIV. PROC. CODE § 104 [p. 55] (Thail.), 
http://www.imolin.org/doc/amlid/Thailand_The%20Civil%20Procedure%20Code.pdf. The latter provi-
sion has been interpreted as requiring the court to decide the case by comparing the weight of the 
evidence of both parties. PANYA SUTHIBODEE, THE LAW OF EVIDENCE 11 (Ramkhamhaeng Univ. Press 
1998). The situation is similar in the People’s Republic of China. Compare CRIMINAL PROCEDURE LAW
OF THE PEOPLE’S REPUBLIC OF CHINA (promulgated by the 11th National People’s Conference, effective 
2012) art. 53, http://www.inchinalaw.com/wp-content/uploads/2013/09/PRC-Criminal-Procedure-Law-
2012.pdf (“Evidence shall be deemed to be sufficient and concrete” when  “the ascertained facts have 
been proved beyond reasonable doubt”), with PROVISIONS OF THE SUPREME PEOPLE’S COURT ON 
EVIDENCE IN CIVIL PROCEEDINGS (Promulgated by the Supreme People’s Court, effective April 1, 
2002) art. 73,
http://seafarersrights.org/wp/wp-content/uploads/2014/11/CHN_LEGISLATION_EVIDENCE-IN-
CIVIL-PROCEDURES_2001_ENG.pdf (“Where both parties concerned respectively produce contrary 
evidence to prove the same fact, but neither party has sufficient grounds to negate each other’s evi-
dence, the people’s court shall, in light of the case details, decide whether the probative force of one 
party’s evidence is obviously more powerful than that of the evidence from the other party, and confirm 
the evidence with the more powerful probative force.”). However, in Thailand and a number of other 
civil law jurisdictions, it is (illogically) assumed that a failure to prove certain facts under the higher 
criminal law standard of persuasion conclusively establishes the non-existence of those facts under the 
lower civil litigation standard. See, e.g., Thailand Supreme Court decisions 349/2555, 1144/2553, and 
9209/2553, interpreting CODE OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE art. 46, which states “In giving judgment in 
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that the judges be convinced of the truth of the matter at issue, without 
specifying any particular degree of belief, and there is reason to believe that 
in practice the required degree of belief is lower in civil cases.120
A literal interpretation of the “balance of probability” standard and a 
similar common interpretation of the “preponderance of the evidence” 
standard as merely requiring a “more likely than not” probability (rather 
than belief) have led many academics and some courts in common law 
jurisdictions to assume that all that is required for proof of causation in a
specific instance is an aggregate fifty-plus percent class-based statistical 
probability.121 As courts in Australia and civil law jurisdictions generally 
state, courts in common law jurisdictions often state, and the British Su-
preme Court has recently affirmed, the standard of persuasion in both crim-
inal and civil law cases requires formation of an actual belief, rather than 
reliance on a mere statistical probability, to prove that causation actually 
existed in a particular situation.122 An abstract class-based statistical proba-
bility of causation, no matter how high, does not instantiate any element in 
any causal law or generalization, nor does it otherwise provide any help in 
determining whether the causal laws underlying the generalization were 
fully instantiated in the specific situation. Only concrete evidence of the 
actual conditions in a specific situation is capable of participating in such 
instantiation.123
Puppe agrees that mere statistical probability is not sufficient proof of 
actual causation for deterministic causal processes, but she believes that 
certain processes, especially the development of cancer, are partly indeter-
ministic, and she has offered a method to adapt the NESS covering law 
120. See STEEL, supra note 1, at 50–51, 53–55, 59–60; VAN DAM, supra note 6, at 316; Fairgrieve 
& G’sell-Macrez, supra note 1, at 123; Wright, Proving Causation, supra note 118, at 195–205, 212–
20; Mark Schweizer, The Civil Standard of Proof – What Is It, Actually?, 20 INT’L J. EVID. & PROOF
(forthcoming 2016); Michele Taruffo, Rethinking the Standards of Proof, 51 AM. J. COMP. L. 659, 665–
67 (2003).
121. STEEL, supra note 1, at 50–51, 53–55, 59–60; VAN DAM, supra note 6, at 316; Schweizer, 
supra note 120; Taruffo, supra note 120, at 662–64, 667–71; Wright, Proving Causation, supra note 
118, at 196.
122. Sinkiewicz v. Greif (UK) Ltd. [2011] UKSC 10 [¶¶ 217-219]; STEEL, supra note 1, at 51 
n.15, 53–55, 59–60, 89–91, 97–98 (Australia, France, Germany); GREEN, supra note 103, at 11–12;
Fairgrieve & G’Sell Macrez, supra note 1, at 123; Taruffo, supra note 120, at 662–64, 667–71; Wright, 
Proving Causation, supra note 118, at 195–96, 195 n.2, 199–205; cf. Fairgrieve & G’sell-Macrez, supra 
note 1, at 123 (noting French courts’ aversion to probability-based explanations); STEEL at 87–89 
(discussing Sinkewicz). Steel relegates Australian courts’ insistence on actual belief in the truth of the 
asserted fact rather than a mere probability to a footnote and argues that German and other courts’
reliance on a very high degree of statistical probability in certain situations amounts to approval of a 
mere “evidential” probability of causation rather than a warranted actual belief in causation. See id.
at 50–51, 50–51 nn.14–15, 54–55, 59–60, 61–66, 80–103.
123. See HAACK, supra note 117, at 17–20, 47–48, 52–64, 268–93; Wright, Pruning, supra note 
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account for these processes: instead of a minimal sufficient condition we 
have to formulate a complete description of the objective probability. A 
condition is a legitimate element of the lawful explanation of an objective 
probability if it increases this probability, and if this is the case the one who 
caused this condition is responsible for the actual result.124 Wright disa-
grees for several reasons, including, especially, the fact that this approach 
apparently would treat any condition that merely increases the risk, ex ante,
as a cause of the actual harm.
Courts today increasingly have to deal with situations in which specif-
ic causation cannot be proven or disproven, due to insufficient knowledge 
of the relevant causal laws and/or the actual conditions in the specific situa-
tion or to probabilistic elements in the relevant processes. Some courts in 
common law jurisdictions and even a few in civil law jurisdictions, relying 
on probabilistic interpretations of the applicable “balance of probability” 
and “preponderance of the evidence” standards of persuasion, have treated 
proof of a mere class-based statistical probability of causation as sufficient 
proof of actual causation in some situations, most notably in cases involv-
ing toxic or carcinogenic substances or medical failures to properly diag-
nose or treat an adverse medical condition. In other situations, for example, 
those involving theoretically divisible but practically indivisible injuries or 
practically indistinguishable defendants, they have recognized the fallacy 
of doing this. Like some courts in civil law jurisdictions, they instead have 
considered and sometimes adopted second-best liability provisions by em-
ploying presumptions, reversing the burden of proof, or imposing propor-
tional liability based on the probability of causation.125
The second approach, which recognizes the impossibility of proving 
or disproving specific causation in these situations, is the one that should 
always be followed.126 Failure to do so and instead treating mere statistical 
probability as sufficient proof of actual causation leads to numerous para-
doxes and descriptively and normatively unsustainable results.127 When 
proof of specific causation or its lack is impossible due to insufficient 
knowledge of the relevant causal laws/generalizations and/or the facts in a 
124. Ingeborg Puppe, Zurechnung und Wahrscheinlichkeit [Imputation and Probability], 95 ZSTW
287, 308 (1983).
125. See DIGEST, supra note 47, at 387–89, 436–39; STEEL, supra note 1, at 50–51, 55, 77–103, 
139–369; Wright, Proving Causation, supra note 118, at 212–20; Richard W. Wright, Proving Facts: 
Belief versus Probability, in EUROPEAN TORT LAW 2008, 79, 79–81, 96–105 (Helmut Koziol & Barbara 
C. Steininger eds., 2009).
126. See Fairgrieve & G’sell-Macrez, supra note 1, at 123–24, 126–27; Moréteau, supra note 47,
at 792–801; Wright, Proving Causation, supra note 118, at 205–20. 
127. See L. JONATHAN COHEN, THE PROBABLE AND THE PROVABLE 49–120 (1977); Wright, 
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specific situation and all we have is an aggregate statistical probability of 
specific causation, this should be acknowledged as well as the normative 
issue of appropriate legal responsibility given such irresolvable uncertainty.
VI. CAUSATION IN EFFICIENCY THEORY
The efficiency theorists assume that the purpose of tort law and all 
other areas of law is or should be the maximization of aggregate social 
welfare, with welfare defined (inconsistently, often in the same paper) as 
utility (pleasure or preference satisfaction, in which case efficiency theory 
is simply utilitarianism), wealth as measured by persons’ willingness and 
ability to pay to obtain some resource that they do not have (rather than 
their usually different willingness to sell it if they already have it), or mar-
ket value, all of which are quite different normatively and operationally.128
Although the efficiency theorists agree on the basic goal (maximization of 
aggregate social welfare, however defined or measured), they disagree on 
whether and how tort law serves this goal.
Guido Calabresi, who along with Ronald Coase initiated explicit effi-
ciency analyses of legal responsibility,129 broke the basic maximization of 
social welfare goal down into three subgoals: efficient deterrence (minimi-
zation, ex ante, of expected “primary accident costs,” which are the harms 
suffered by individuals as the result of risk-creating conduct and the pre-
caution costs required to reduce the relevant risks), efficient compensation 
(minimization, ex post, of “secondary accident costs,” which are the disutil-
ities suffered by the victims of actual harm, by shifting those losses to 
wealthier individuals (“deep pockets”) or spreading them as widely as pos-
sible), and efficient administration (minimization of “tertiary accident 
costs,” which are the costs to all involved of processing tort liability 
claims).130 Since efficient compensation conflicts with efficient deterrence 
and is best accomplished by social insurance, with tort liability being one 
of the worst possible alternatives, post-Calabresi efficiency theories of tort 
law have ignored efficient compensation and instead focused on efficient 
128. See Richard W. Wright, The Efficiency Theory of Causation and Responsibility: Unscientific 
Formalism and False Semantics, 63 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 553, 564, 564 n.52 (1987) [hereinafter Wright, 
Semantics].
129. See generally Guido Calabresi, Some Thoughts on Risk Distribution and the Law of Torts, 70 
YALE L.J. 499 (1961); R.H. Coase, The Problem of Social Cost, 3 J. L. & ECON. 1, 16 (1960).
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deterrence and efficient administration (minimizing the sum of primary and 
tertiary accident costs).131
Given their focus on efficient deterrence, the efficiency theorists have 
had a hard time explaining any aspect of tort law, despite its being the fo-
cus of all of their initial writings on legal responsibility.132 The biggest 
problem for the efficiency theorists is the causation requirement, with its ex
post focus on past injuries and their causes rather than ex ante focus on 
future expected harm. Initially, the efficiency theorists tried to minimize 
the practical importance of the causation requirement. They argued that, 
since injuries always result from the interaction of the plaintiff’s and de-
fendant’s activities, each activity is a cause of the particular interaction and 
its effects, so the causation requirement is trivially satisfied and the only 
significant issue is how liability should be assigned among the interacting 
activities to minimize aggregate social costs or, equivalently, maximize 
aggregate social benefits.133
However, this argument does not explain or justify tort law or its cau-
sation requirement. It does not explain why liability is limited to those situ-
ations in which an injury has occurred and is further limited to harm that 
was caused by the tortious aspect of the defendant’s conduct or, even if 
liability is so limited, why the plaintiff should obtain compensation for the 
injury.134 As Calabresi has explained,135 since efficient deterrence focuses 
on providing ex ante incentives for efficient behavior rather than ex post
compensation of injuries, liability equal to the expected harm could be 
131. The efficient compensation goal had a very brief life as a judicially applied rationale (along 
with efficient deterrence) for strict product liability. See Beshada v. Johns-Mansville Products Corp., 
447 A.2d 539, 548 (N.J. 1982), limited to its facts by Feldman v. Lederle Labs, 479 A.2d 374, 386–88 
(N.J. 1984); Richard W. Wright, The Principles of Product Liability, 26 REV. LITIG. 1067, 1092–1107 
(2007) [hereinafter Wright, Product Liability].
132. See, e.g., Richard W. Wright, Principled Adjudication: Tort Law and Beyond, 7 
CANTERBURY L. REV. 265, 282–93 (1999) (consent, contributory negligence, intentional torts, and 
punitive damages); Richard W. Wright, Hand, Posner, and the Myth of the “Hand Formula,” 4
THEORETICAL INQUIRIES L. 145, l45 (2003) [hereinafter Wright, Hand Formula] (the standards of care 
in negligence law); Richard W. Wright, Negligence in the Courts: Introduction and Commentary, 77 
CHI.-KENT L. REV. 425, 466–82 (2002) (objective versus subjective perspective); Wright, Product 
Liability, supra note 131, at 1092–1122; Richard W. Wright, Private Nuisance Law: A Window on 
Substantive Justice, in RIGHTS AND PRIVATE LAW 491 (Donal Nolan & Andrew Robertson eds., 2012); 
Richard W. Wright, Actual Causation vs. Probabilistic Linkage: The Bane of Economic Analysts, 14 J.
LEGAL STUD. 435, 442–44, 446–48 (1985) [hereinafter Wright, Bane] (overdetermined causation and 
limitations on the scope of attributable responsibility); Wright, Semantics, supra note 128, at 571–75 
(same).
133. E.g., John Prather Brown, Toward an Economic Theory of Liability, 2 J. LEGAL STUD. 323, 
326 (1973); Calabresi, supra note 129, at 505–06, 506 n.24; Coase, supra note 129, at 2, 13, 19, 27.
134. Wright, Bane, supra note 132, at 438.
135. CALABRESI, supra note 130, at 6–7, 6 n.8, 22–23, 130, 156, 239–43, 247–51, 254–57, 266–
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imposed on the actor whenever his conduct creates risks to others (to force 
him to internalize the expected costs to others), or whenever he behaves 
inefficiently, or—to reduce enforcement costs—at least whenever his con-
duct or activity contributes to an injury (with a multiplier to adjust for the 
frequency of proven actual injuries compared to expected injuries), regard-
less of whether the injury was caused by the inefficient aspect of his con-
duct or activity. Such liability could be imposed through fines payable to 
the state, rather than providing any compensation to the person, if any, 
suffering an injury.136
Subsequently, acknowledging the historical persistence and normative 
significance of causation as a requirement for tort liability, Calabresi at-
tempted to provide an efficiency explanation for the requirement. To facili-
tate doing so, he initiated a semantic maneuver that has since been copied 
by other efficiency theorists. Relying on and expanding the confusion be-
tween causation in its basic sense and so-called “proximate” or “legal” 
causation, he treated causation as a linguistically manipulable term to be
employed as desired to achieve “certain [aggregate social welfare] goals 
that have come to be accepted as crucial to the law of torts.”137 He treated 
as causal concepts not only the usual strong necessity (sine qua non) crite-
rion for actual causation, but also the attributable responsibility limitations 
on liability for tortiously caused injury, traditionally and misleadingly re-
ferred to as “proximate causation.” He also included a “causal linkage” 
concept, which is more accurately described as a “probabilistic linkage,” 
since it merely refers to ex ante increased risk: an act is “causally linked” to 
an actual injury or even a merely potential injury, whether or not it contrib-
uted to the actual injury or an injury even occurred, if the recurrence of the 
act in the future will increase the risk of occurrence of a similar injury.138
136. Posner argues that full compensation must be provided to persons injured by defendants’
inefficient conduct to provide an incentive for such victims to sue and to prevent such victims from 
engaging in inefficient excessive precaution against potential injury. RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC 
ANALYSIS OF LAW § 6.10 (8th ed. 2011). However, if a fine payable to the government is properly set 
to obtain efficient behavior by potential injurers, the victim who is not expecting compensation will 
minimize her expected injury and precaution costs by engaging in efficient rather than excessive pre-
caution. See Brown, supra note 133, at 340–42; Richard W. Wright, Allocating Liability Among Multi-
ple Responsible Causes: A Principled Defense of Joint and Several Liability for Actual Harm and Risk
Exposure, 21 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1141, 1170–74 (1985). There is no need to limit enforcement to 
victims rather than whoever might be the most efficient enforcer of the liability rules (e.g., trial lawyers) 
or to turn over to the enforcer all of the fine rather than only a portion of it as a sufficient (contingent 
fee) incentive for enforcement action.
137. Guido Calabresi, Concerning Cause and the Law of Torts: An Essay for Harry Kalven, Jr., 43 
U. CHI. L. REV. 69, 71 (1975-1976).





      05/10/2016   13:13:34
37837-ckt_91-2 Sheet No. 35 Side A      05/10/2016   13:13:34
03 WRIGHT PUPPE-FINAL (DO NOT DELETE) 4/14/2016 7:21 PM
2016] CAUSATION 497
When Calabresi evaluated the usefulness of these three concepts in 
promoting the minimization of aggregate social costs, he concluded that 
none of them were useful and indeed all were detrimental for achieving 
efficient compensation.139 He also concluded that, while the “causal link-
age” concept is highly relevant for both “specific deterrence” (prevention 
of activities deemed to be inefficient per se or otherwise undesirable) and 
“market deterrence” (deterrence through pricing mechanisms, including 
liability costs, of inefficient behavior), the only one of the concepts that 
addresses actual causation (the “but for” test) is inconsistent with “specific 
deterrence”140 and is only one of several alternatives, but not the best or 
even close to adequate, for achieving “market deterrence,” by providing 
data for the creation of “an actuarial basis from which actors can decide 
whether future safety costs are cheaper or more expensive than future inju-
ry costs.”141 He thus attempted to recast tort law’s actual causation re-
quirement as a “flexible and functional” term that does not refer to any 
“inherent, ‘natural’ relationships” but instead, because of its “historical, 
common law gloss” and moral appeal, can and should be used to describe 
efforts to “identify those pressure points that are most amenable to the so-
cial goals we wish to accomplish.”142
Other prominent efficiency theorists have followed Calabresi’s lead in 
attempting to recast the ex post actual causation analysis as an ex ante effi-
ciency analysis. The first to do so was Steven Shavell, who employs the 
term “probabilistic cause” rather than “causal linkage” to refer to mere 
increased risk and, like Calabresi, includes it as a supposed “basic notion of 
causation.”143 Using unrealistic and inconsistent assumptions (including 
courts’ having perfect information), contrived illustrations, and defective 
arguments and mathematical formulas,144 he claims to prove that tort law’s 
actual causation requirement, which, like Calabresi, he equates with “but 
for” causation, is consistent with and indeed required for efficient deter-
rence under a strict liability regime.145 (He admits that under a negligence 
139. Calabresi, supra note 137, at 73–77; see Wright, Bane, supra note 132, at 440.
140. Calabresi, supra note 137, at 79; see CALABRESI, supra note 130, at 269–70, 370 n.5; Wright, 
Bane, supra note 132, at 440–41.
141. Calabresi, supra note 137, at 85; see id. at 85–86; CALABRESI, supra note 130, at 251, 251 
n.8, 247–49, 257–58, 287 n.2; Wright, Bane, supra note 132, at 441–42.
142. Calabresi, supra note 137, at 106–08.
143. Steven Shavell, An Analysis of Causation and the Scope of Liability in the Law of Torts, 9 J.
LEGAL STUD. 463, 466, 468, 468 n.17 (1980).
144. See Paul Burrows, Tort and Tautology: The Logic of Restricting the Scope of Liability, 13 J.
LEGAL STUD. 399, 400 (1984); Mark F. Grady, Causation and Foreseeability, in RESEARCH 
HANDBOOK ON THE ECONOMICS OF TORT LAW 114, 118–21 (Jennifer H. Arlen ed., 2013); Wright, 
Bane, supra note 132, at 444–52.
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liability regime the causation requirement undermines rather than promotes 
efficient deterrence.146) However, his arguments and supposed proofs do 
not employ the ex post inquiry into what actually happened, irrespective of 
what was foreseen or known beforehand, that is the essence of the factual 
causation inquiry. Rather, he relies on supposed perfect knowledge by ac-
tors, prior to engaging in some conduct or activity, of the subsequent play-
out of the risks created by that conduct or activity—that is, on ex ante
“probabilistic causation” rather than ex post actual causation.147 Moreover, 
his arguments and proofs involve situations in which there are multiple 
actual (duplicative) or hypothetical (preempted) independently sufficient 
causes. In such situations, contrary to his assertions, the courts usually rec-
ognize that actual causation exists despite a lack of but-for causation, with 
liability depending on whether the “no worse off” limitation on attributable 
responsibility applies.148
In their article on causation, William Landes and Richard Posner re-
peat Shavell’s error of equating ex ante increased risk with ex post actual 
causation, but with an opposite effect. Shavell uses ex ante risk analysis 
and claims he is using ex post causal analysis, while Landes and Posner use 
ex post causal analysis and claim they are using ex ante risk analysis. This 
is most evident in their discussion of Weeks v. McNulty,149 a case in which 
the defendant, McNulty, failed to install the statutorily required fire escapes 
in his hotel. The victim, Weeks, died in the hotel as a result of a fire. The 
court concluded that McNulty was not liable, despite the negligent failure 
to install the fire escapes, since the evidence proved that Weeks would not 
have tried to use the fire escapes even if they had been installed: an actual 
causation rationale. Landes and Posner argue:
[T]o reason thus is to assume the conclusion. We want a ground of deci-
sion that will not depend explicitly on any notion of cause and we find it 
in the [Hand formula’s aggregate risk-utility analysis of negligent con-
duct]. Evidence that the fire escapes would not have averted Weeks’s 
death means, in the context of our model, that the probability of his death 
146. Id. at 485–86. Shavell argues that when courts do not have perfect information “a significant 
element of strict liability is inherent in the negligence rule” and thus that “all the conclusions reached 
about the scope of liability under strict liability [would be] relevant under the negligence rule.” Id. at 
489. However, the existence of imperfect information does not make negligence liability equivalent or 
even similar to strict liability. See Grady, supra note 144, at 118–21; Wright, Bane, supra note 132, at 
451–52; infra notes 154–57 and accompanying text.
147. Wright, Bane, supra note 132, at 445–46.
148. Id. at 446–48; see Wright, Legal Responsibility, supra note 1, at 1434–52.
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was independent of whether or not a violation occurred . . . and hence 
that due care with respect to [installing fire escapes] was zero.150
This is an ex post causal analysis masquerading as an ex ante risk 
analysis. The failure to install the fire escapes unreasonably increased the 
ex ante risk of injury to every guest in the hotel, including Weeks, and thus 
was negligent (as the legislature determined), although as it turned out it 
did not contribute to Weeks’s death. Landes and Posner similarly employ 
ex post causal analysis while claiming to be employing the Hand formula’s 
ex ante analysis of negligence in their discussions of other types of situa-
tions.151 If they consistently employed ex post knowledge of what actually 
occurred to modify (replace) the analysis of ex ante risk, they would end up 
imposing negligence liability in many cases in which the defendant’s be-
havior was not negligent but nevertheless caused an injury. For example, 
assume an automobile driver is involved in a serious accident despite care-
ful driving. Using their method of taking into account what actually oc-
curred, as revealed ex post, to calculate the ex ante required care, the 
“expected” cost of failing to exercise additional care was a 100 percent 
probability of a serious accident, which would almost always require much 
higher care than the driver exercised, including, if nothing else would pre-
vent the accident, forgoing driving that day.152
The attempts by Calabresi, Landes, Posner, and Shavell to replace the 
actual causation requirement with an ex ante or ex post analysis of negli-
gent (presumably inefficient) conduct continue to be accepted and repeated 
by efficiency theorists, despite the obvious serious defects in these at-
tempts.153
150. William M. Landes & Richard A. Posner, Causation in Tort Law: An Economic Approach, 12 
J. LEGAL STUD. 109, 115–16 (1983).
151. Id. at 119–22; see Wright, Bane, supra note 132, at 453–55; Wright, Legal Responsibility,
supra note 1, at 1520–21, 1521 n.320.
152. Landes and Posner responded to this criticism by continuing to insist that they are using ex
ante risk analysis rather than ex post causal analysis:
[Wright’s] criticism is incorrect. The point is that the owner’s carelessness [in the Weeks
case] did not in fact make it more likely ex ante that Weeks would die, given the particular 
circumstances of the fire. For we know, although after the fact, that even if the hotel own-
er had been careful, Weeks would have died anyway.
WILLIAM M. LANDES & RICHARD A. POSNER, THE ECONOMIC STRUCTURE OF TORT LAW 235 (1987). 
As they implicitly acknowledge by referring to the owner’s “carelessness,” the owner was negligent 
given the ex ante risks. Their contrary conclusion is, again, based on ex post factual causation analysis 
masquerading as ex ante risk analysis. See id. at 238.
153. E.g., Robert D. Cooter, Torts as the Union of Liberty and Efficiency: An Essay on Causation,
63 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 522, 523–24 (1987); Keith N. Hylton, Causation in Tort Law: A Reconsidera-
tion, in RESEARCH HANDBOOK ON THE ECONOMICS OF TORT LAW, supra note 144, 97, 100–01, 103, 
107–12; Keith N. Hylton, Information and Causation in Tort Law: Generalizing the Learned Hand Test 
for Causation Cases, 7 J. TORT L. 35, 37, 40–42, 45–49 (2015); Keith N. Hylton & Haizhen Lin, Negli-
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When the efficiency theorists acknowledge the distinct natures of the
negligent conduct and actual causation requirements for tort liability, they 
generally define negligence as a departure from the economically optimal 
(aggregate social welfare maximizing) level of care and a cause as a strong-
ly necessary (sine qua non or “but for”) condition. Given these definitions, 
assuming perfect information, risk neutrality, solvent defendants, and per-
fect enforcement (i.e., all valid claims are successfully pursued), and set-
ting aside dynamic efficiency concerns (the effect on stability of 
entitlements of constantly shifting resources to their highest-value use, as 
contemplated by the efficiency theories of liability), a liability rule will be 
efficient if and only if it subjects every person who contributed to an injury 
liable for at least the full amount of the injury if she behaved inefficiently, 
relieves all but one person of any liability if they behaved efficiently, and 
holds (or leaves) that one remaining person (defendant or plaintiff) liable 
for the exact amount of the injury. Given the highly restrictive (implausi-
ble) assumptions, there are many theoretically efficient negligence liability 
rules, including those with no defense or a complete or partial (comparative 
responsibility) defense of plaintiff’s contributory negligence, with various 
options, including joint and several liability and proportional several liabil-
ity, for allocating liability among multiple responsible parties. Strict liabil-
ity rules will be efficient only if there is a contributory negligence defense 
and only if, ex ante, there is only one possible defendant. No liability rule 
will be efficient if any of the unrealistic assumptions are not satisfied.154
Moreover, given imperfect information, none of the rules proposed by 
the efficiency theorists are descriptively plausible.155 As most efficiency 
theorists admit,156 the courts cannot and do not define negligence as a fail-
ure to exercise economically optimal care. To employ such a standard, a
court would need information on the costs and benefits of the actually tak-
en precautions and all possible untaken precautions, by not only the poten-
tial defendant but also potential plaintiffs and anyone else in a position to 
Shahar, Causation and Foreseeability, in 2 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF LAW AND ECONOMICS 644, 644–52 (B. 
Bouckaert & G. DeGeest eds., 2000), reprinted with updates in 1 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF LAW AND 
ECONOMICS: TORT LAW AND ECONOMICS 83 (Michael Faure ed., 2d ed. 2009).
154. Brown, supra note 133; Wright, Allocating Liability, supra note 136, at 1170–77; Wright, 
New Old Efficiency Theories, supra note †, at 90–95.
155. See Wright, New Old Efficiency Theories, supra note †, at 83–90. 
156. E.g., RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW OF TORTS: LIABILITY FOR PHYSICAL AND 
EMOTIONAL HARM § 3 cmt. h (AM. LAW INST. 2010); LANDES & POSNER, supra note 152, at 20–21 
(“Rarely will there be enough information about the costs and benefits of alternative safety measures to 
enable a confident judgment that the court’s solution is the efficient one.”); id. at 24 (same); Mark F. 
Grady, Proximate Cause and the Law of Negligence, 69 IOWA L. REV. 363, 385–91, 396–40, 396 n.68, 
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affect the ultimate outcome, and it would have to calculate the social costs 
of all the various possible combinations in order to find the optimal combi-
nation. Courts are never provided with such complete information, nor do 
they attempt to make such calculations.
A fundamental problem with the efficiency theories is that they as-
sume that the courts should and do attempt to define liability rules to max-
imize aggregate social welfare, rather than to implement interactive justice, 
which focuses on the promotion of everyone’s equal external freedom in 
their interactions with others. As one of us has explained in detail else-
where, the courts’ liability determinations are consistent with the justice 
theory rather than the efficiency theories. For example, regardless of the 
aggregate cost-benefit balance, the courts hold a defendant liable for put-
ting others at risk if those risks were significant unless the risks were nec-
essary for those being put at risk to obtain, directly as participants or 
indirectly as members of society, desired benefits from the defendant’s 
risk-creating activity that significantly outweigh the risks. Conversely, 
courts will not hold a defendant liable for failing to save another whom she 
did not put at risk unless, perhaps, the rescue effort would have imposed a 
minimal burden on the defendant, and will not hold a plaintiff contributori-
ly negligent for putting herself at risk to save another unless there was no 
fair chance of saving the other.157
VII. CONCLUSION
As we previously noted, judges and lawyers frequently assert that 
philosophical analyses of causation are irrelevant and unhelpful in the law 
and, indeed, confuse rather than enlighten.158 While this is a fair description 
of much philosophical analysis, we have attempted in this paper to demon-
strate that careful philosophical analysis is essential for distinguishing, 
clarifying and properly resolving the descriptive issue of causation (in its 
basic natural/actual/factual sense) and the normative issue of proper legal 
responsibility, each of which currently is poorly understood and thus the 
subject of confused and confusing discussions by courts and legal scholars.
It is true, as critics often state, that a proper philosophical analysis of 
causation leads to an almost infinite number of contributing conditions for 
any specific injury. However, while this is a problem for scientists, it 
should not worry lawyers. In law as well as ordinary life, we are not inter-
157. See Wright, Hand Formula, supra note 132, at 180–238; supra note 132 and accompanying 
text.
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ested in determining all of the practically innumerable immediate and re-
mote causes of every event or state of affairs. Rather, we are only interested 
in the possible causes of discrete legally recognized injuries, and we are 
interested in only a very few of those possible causes: (i) the wrongful as-
pect of the defendant’s conduct, which is the proper focus of the analysis of 
causation in the law, (ii) the negligent aspect (if any) of the plaintiff’s con-
duct, which may result in application of the defense of contributory negli-
gence, and (iii) highly unexpected and strongly necessary intervening 
conditions or independently strongly sufficient non-liable conditions, 
which generally will result in denials of legal responsibility despite tortious 
causation of the plaintiff’s injury by the defendant. Legal responsibility 
may also be denied for wrongful conditions that made only a trivial contri-
bution to the injury or for an injury that was not the result of the realization 
and working out of a risk that made the defendant’s conduct wrongful.159
Moreover, failures to act to prevent an injury generally are not considered
to be legally wrongful, or are considered wrongful only in very limited 
circumstances, if the person who failed to act had no pre-existing duty to 
act.160
While, pending further discussion, we disagree on some issues, such 
disagreement should not detract from our agreement on the most funda-
mental issues, including the NESS (weak necessity/strong sufficiency) 
covering law account of causation, the rejection of counterfactual possible 
worlds analysis, the inclusion of omissions and other absences as causes, 
the importance of focusing the causal analysis on the properties of events 
and states of affairs rather than events and states of affairs as a whole, and, 
relatedly, the importance of focusing the causal analysis for purposes of 
legal responsibility on the causal connection between the wrongful aspects 
of the defendant’s conduct and the relevant legal injury. Whatever disa-
greements we may have now or in the future pale in comparison to the 
defects of any alternative analysis of causation, especially the strong neces-
sity (sine qua non, “but for”) analysis as an exclusive and/or counterfactual 
analysis or any account that purports not to rely on causal laws.
159. See supra text accompanying notes 6, 56–62, 100.
160. See DOBBS, supra note 48, at 853.
